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INTRODUCTION
That recent years have witnessed revolutionary reforms and devel-
opments in the common law of torts, and particularly in negligence,
comes as no surprise to anyone teaching, studying, or practicing in this
field. That these reforms and developments have been supported by a
substantial majority of legal writers is equally obvious to anyone familiar
with the literature on the subject. What may not be so obvious, and
therefore what I have chosen to advance as the thesis of this article, is
that these widely welcomed developments, taken together, seriously
threaten the integrity and even the survival of the system of negligence-
based liability toward the improvement of which they were originally
advanced. Simply stated, we torts people, especially the torts teachers and
scholars among us, are in serious trouble; and the sooner we wake up
to what we are doing to ourselves and to our subject, the better.
The source of the difficulty, as I shall attempt to demonstrate in the
following analysis, is the tendency in recent years to focus upon the
substantive objectives of our liability system almost to the total ex-
clusion of any shared concern for the realities and limitations of the
processes by which those objectives are realized. The overlooked fact is
that adjudication has limits which may be exceeded regularly only at
great risk to the integrity of the judicial process. The most basic limit
of adjudication is that it requires substantive rules of sufficient specificity
to support orderly and rational argument on the question of liability.
The reforms and changes in the law of negligence in recent years have,
purportedly to advance identifiable social objectives, eliminated much of
the specificity with which negligence principles traditionally have been
formulated. We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be
determined routinely on a case by case, "under all the circumstances"
basis, with decision makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest
of general principles. When that day arrives, the retreat from the rule
of law will be complete, principled decision will have been replaced with
decision by whim, and the common law of negligence will have de-
generated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly disguised lottery.
Specifically, my objectives in this article are: (1) to develop a
basic theory of adjudication which reveals both the limits of that process
and the necessity for relatively specific rules of decision; (2) to ex-
plain the manner in which traditional negligence doctrines have served
to render the liability issue adjudicable; (3) to describe recent substan-
tive developments in the law of negligence in a way that will demon-
state the threat they pose to the integrity of our traditional common law
liability system; and (4) to suggest steps which must be taken to reduce
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the threat and to help to assure the continued vitality of our torts system.
In the course of my analysis, I shall have some unkind words for torts
scholars and writers. Much of what has been published in recent years
has been relatively indifferent to the problems raised here; some of it
has been downright irresponsible. However, I do not intend to create
the impression that I am alone in the concerns herein expressed. A
number of torts writers have expressed concern over the workability of
a system of tort liability guided only by general principles. It is in the
hope of bringing others over to this point of view that the following
analysis is offered.
I. THE LiMITS OF ADJUDICATION
Adjudication is a social process of decisionmaking in which the
affected parties are guaranteed the opportunity of presenting proofs and
arguments to an impartial tribunal' which is bound to find the relevant
facts and to apply recognized rules to reach a reasoned result.' It is
certainly not the only process of decision in which interested parties are
afforded the opportunity to participate-elections call for participation
through voting, and contracts involve participation through negotiation.
But adjudication is unique in that each affected party's participation
takes the form of a claim, supported by proof and argument, that estab-
lished legal rules entitle him to a favorable result as a matter of right.
The dominant mood with which a judicial tribunal approaches its task
of decision is that of seeking, in accordance with applicable rules, the
s;ngle right result in each case.3
It follows from this characterization of the nature of the litigants'
participation in adjudication that only certain kinds of problems, or at
least problems which are framed in a certain way, lend themselves to
being solved rationally by the adjudicative process. Essentially, these
are problems to which recognized rules of decision apply sufficiently
'The word "tribunal" is employed here to emphasize that I am not referring to the
judge, as such, but to the judicial institution as a whole. I shall employ the word "court"
in the same way-to refer to the institution, very often judge and jury, by which torts dis-
putes are adjudicated.
2 See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 19. I am
indebted to Professor Fuller for the basic principles regarding the nature and limits of
adjudication. See also Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Coi-oi. L. REv. 1531, 1534-39 (1973).
3 I am aware of the influence in recent years of the legal realists and the tendency for
lawyers today to recognize that courts do, and must, exercise discretion in deciding cases.
See, e.g., authorities cited in note 25 infra. However, I would insist that my statement,
hedged with the notion of "dominant mood," is accurate and useful. See K. LLEwELLyr,
THE Com.,sjoN LAw TnsDroN 24-25 (1960).
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limiting the range of inquiry and isolating the issues presented so that
each issue may be addressed by the parties in turn, to the temporary
exclusion of the other issues. There may be a relatively large number
of issues to be decided which may be, and usually are, related logically
to one another. But as each is addressed in argument, the litigants may
temporarily exclude consideration of the others and assume a favorable
result with regard to them. The common law of contracts provides some
of the clearest examples of problems framed in such a way as to lend
themselves readily to adjudication. Potentially, at least, a contracts case
involves the resolution of one of the most unadjudicable problems imagin-
able-the allocation of scarce resources in society. However, the case is
rendered manageable by the legal rules, recognized by courts to govern
liability in contract, which operate to present the issues in a way that
supports meaningful participation by the affected parties. The parties
argue over whether the elements of a contract are present, not over
whether a particular allocation of resources is in the overall best in-
terest of society.' A relatively large number of issues may be presented-
e.g., offer, lapse, acceptance, breach, excuse, and measure of recovery;
but the issues will have been arranged and ordered by the law of con-
tracts so that the parties may address them in an orderly sequence. The
participation of the parties in the decision of such a case will be mean-
ingful in the sense that they will be able to rely upon established rules
of decision and to argue as a matter of right for a jhdgment in their
favor.5
4 To be sure, considerations of reasonableness and public policy play a part in the
argument and decision of even technical contract issues. See, e.g., L. S nsoN, CONTRACrS
§ 102 at 212 nn.24-26 (2d ed. 1965). But only in a limited and relatively formal way are the
"interests of society" recognized as part of the actual criteria for decision. See id. §§ 314-21
at 430-56. On a philosophical plane, it is probably true that even the most formal rule may
require that the interests of society be considered in its application. See note 27 infra &
text accompanying. However, practically speaking the formality of contract law reduces the
necessity of such considerations to a workably minimal level.
51 should emphasize that in speaking of recognized rules of decision as prerequisites to
adjudication, I do not intend to imply that courts are incapable of playing a role in the
creation and development of such rules. Obviously, courts have traditionally, and quite
properly, participated in the common law process of formulating and refining rules of de-
cision. See generally B. CARaozo, TBm NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1952); R. KEETON,
VENTURING To Do Jusric (1969); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COmmON LAW TRADITON (1960).
Because my quarrel is not with judicial law reform, as such, but rather with the particular
nature of recent reforms in tort law, an in-depth exploration of the methods by which
courts create law is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the phenomenon
which concerns me here--i.e., the abandonment of formality in the rules governing negli-
gence-based liability-poses very different, and more serious, problems than does the phe-
nomenon of courts engaging in the continuing process of rule creation, refinement, and
reform.
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Most of the problems which arise every day in our society are not
the subject of relatively specific rules of decision, and therefore are un-
adjudicable. For example, solutions to problems such as "What shall I
eat for lunch today?" or "What shall my family and I do with ourselves
during our next vacation?" or "How shall our society'react to the physi-
cal degradation of the environment?"6 cannot sensibly be adjudicated
because of the absence of recognized rules of decision narrowing and
issue isolation which would permit these problems to be addressed ra-
tionally by the affected parties urging the tribunal to arrive at a single
right result. Instead of being arranged in an essentially linear manner,
as are the issues in a classically legal problem, the issues, or elements,
in these problems are interrelated in such a way that sensible considera-
tion of any issue, or element, requires the simultaneous consideration
of most, or all, of the others. Because adjudication requires problems
the various issues and elements of which may be taken up in an orderly
sequence, it follows that adjudication is not suited to solving the prob-
lems last described, at least in the absence of rules of decision which
serve to narrow and isolate the issues presented.
Of course, simply because these problems do not lend themselves
to being solved by adjudication does not mean that they are incapable of
intelligent solution. Processes of decision which do not depend upon
recognized rules of decision are perfectly suited to addressing open-
ended problems of the sort with which we are here concerned. Two such
processes deserve special mention: contract negotiation and the exer-
cise of managerial authority.7 In contract negotiation, the, affected par-
ties work out a mutually acceptable solution through the give-and-take
process of arm's length bargaining. Managerial authority is exercised
when one person has the authority to impose his own, discretionary8
solution upon those affected thereby. Once again, the difference between
adjudication and these other processes of decision rests not only upon
the presence in the former of relatively specific rules of decision, but
also upon the very different way in which the affected parties participate.
Although the exercise of managerial authority may superficially resem-
ble adjudication, in actuality the manager acts differently from a court.9
6 The assumption here is that there are no applicable rules of decision. Stated in this
fashion, these questions are clearly unadjudicable. We will consider in a later section the
extent to which problems involving harm to the environment are being rendered amenable
to adjudication. See pp. 495-50 infra.
7See generally Fuller, Adjudication and the Rul of Law, 1960 PRoc. Am. Soc' INTL
L. 1, 5.
8 The implications of the term "discretionary" are developed later. See notes 25-27 &
text accompanying.
9 Again, I am using "court" in its broad sense. See note 1 supra.
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Thus, the persons affected by the manager's decision might be given
the opportunity to plead for a favorable result, in the sense that they
might be allowed to exercise their vocal chords or practice their typing.
But without sufficiently specific rules of decision, their participation
would not be the sort guaranteed at the outset. In the end, bound by
no legal rule of decision, the manager would be left to decide the case
largely on his own, employing common sense, or instinct, or intuition.
To appreciate more fully the way in which legal rules function in
permitting litigants to participate meaningfully in adjudication, it will
be helpful to consider a concrete example of what would happen if for
some reason the rules of decision failed to perform their above-described
function of limiting and isolating the issues presented. Let us consider
the second hypothetical example of an unadjudicable problem advanced
above-.e., the problem of planning the family vacation. In most in-
stances, of course, families are able to work out amicable solutions to
this problem by means of a combination of negotiation and managerial
authority. However, it is not difficult to imagine an otherwise happy
family of four (husband, wife, and two teenage children) hopelessly
fragmented over such a problem.1" What would happen if a court were
to undertake to resolve the question of where the family should go, and
what it should do, on its next vacation? One can easily envision each
of the four affected family members being given the opportunity in court
to plead, in turn, for a result favorable to him or her. Depending upon
how it were handled, such a proceeding could certainly be made to re-
semble adjudication, at least superficially. However, assuming that eco-
nomic circumstances permitted a fairly wide range of choice, and assum-
ing there were no more specific guide to decision than "what is best for
the family,"" or "the most reasonable compromise," would the parties
be able effectively to participate as litigants in the decision process in
accordance with the classic adjudicative model advanced earlier?
Most emphatically, "No." In the absence of recognized rules which
might serve as the basis for making a principled decision, the permuta-
1oIt will be observed that the tangential, though superficial, problems of too few liti-
gants (e.g., the problem of today's lunch menu, supra), or too many (e.g., the environ-
mental degradation problem, supra), are not presented. These problems are superficial be-
cause they can be solved by adjusting the procedural rules governing class actions and
standing to sue. See notes 95-96 infra & text accompanying.
"Obviously, a court might look to family custom for a sufficiently specific rule with
which to decide the case. Thus, if in a particular family it were customary to have vacation
plans determined by a single family member each year, the members taking turns, the issue
of "Which vacation?" could be transformed into the more manageable question of 'Those
turn is it this year?" However, I am assuming no such custom is available.
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tions and combinations of considerations which would enter into the in-
telligent planning even of something as relatively mundane as a family
vacation would inevitably frustrate the most skillful litigant and the
most conscientious decisionmaker.' 2 The issues of monetary costs, alter-
native dates, modes of transportation, possible destinations, durations of
stay, types of accommodations, etc., are all interrelated in the non-linear
manner described above, and a decision with regard to any one could
intelligently be made only in relation to decisions with regard to most,
or all, of the others. Even if the court were to choose a single issue-
total cost, for example--upon which to focus initially, any resolution of
that issue would only be tentative in that it would have to be recon-
sidered in rationally resolving the next issue-e.g., the mode (and hence
the cost) of transportation. And then the first two issues would be
"upset" once again when the third issue-e.g., alternative destinations--
was reached; and the first three, when the fourth was reached; and
so on.
13
In the end, the attempted adjudication of such a problem would be
transformed, perhaps subtly, into something other than a trial in which
litigants "present proofs and arguments to an impartial tribunal bound
to apply recognized rules to reach a reasoned result." Either the court
would bring pressure upon the parties (in the extreme, perhaps, by
threatening to deny them any vacation at all) to work out a compro-
mise solution among themselves; or the court would appoint one family
member to make the decision for the family ;14 or the court would assume
the role of a benevolent head of the household who, though willing to
listen patiently to the entreatments of those affected by the decision,
would be free to reach a solution by the exercise of managerial authority,
bound only by the limits of common sense. 5 If, as is likely, the latter
course were followed, the shift from the adjudicative mode to the dis-
12 Once again, I am not suggesting that intelligent vacations are incapable of being
planned, but simply that they cannot be planned in court. Traditionally, families do a
rather good job of planning their leisure activities through a combination of managerial
authority and negotiation. (The more "liberated" the family, the more the emphasis tends
to be upon the latter.)1 3Fuller employs two other examples which may be helpful: dividing an art collection
between two museums on the basis of "Which division is best?" and assigning personnel to
a coachless football team on the basis of "The most effective lineup." See Fuller, Adjudica-
tion and the Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 3-4.
1 4 More than likely, the court would appoint the head of the household to make the
decision, although family custom might suggest a different approach. See note 11 supra.1 5 It is likely that a conscientious judge undertaking such a decision would eventually
convince himself, contrary to reality, that he was acting according to law. For an example
of what can happen when judges are forced into the position of rendering decisions in
these "Where shall we go on our vacation?" cases, see note 105 infra.
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cretionary, managerial mode would not be lost on the participants, who
could be expected correspondingly to shift their arguments away from
the confusing details of the various alternatives and towards appeals to
the court's sympathies, prejudices, and emotions. Once this shift oc-
curred, the parties would become supplicants rather than litigants, and
whatever the court's decision in such a context, it would not be the
product of adjudication.
Accepting for purposes of argument that a case of the sort just
described would be unadjudicable, is the situation altered significantly
if we posit a joint action by the wife and children seeking to have the
court review and set aside vacation plans already arrived at by their
husband-father? That is, does the case become manageable if we assume
a unanimity of interest on the part of the wife and children, joined
against their self-styled patriarch? Here, the court would not be asked
to fashion a vacation plan and impose it upon the family, but rather to
review a plan already devised by the head of the household. Would this
difference render the case adjudicable? The answer depends upon the
legal basis of judicial review. For example, were courts to set vacation
plans aside only if "irrational," the range of inquiry in our hypothetical
case would probably be sufficiently limited to permit the parties to par-
ticipate meaningfully as litigants in the process of judicial review. To
be sure, relatively few cases would end in results favorable to plaintiffs
under such an approach. But the fact remains that irrationality as a
basis of judicial review and decision probably would suffice to support
meaningful, orderly argument.-6 On the other hand, were the courts in
such cases to uphold or set aside vacation plans made by heads of house-
holds depending on whether the plans met some test of "reasonable-
ness"-e.g., whether the plans were "good for the family"-judicial re-
view of vacation plans would surely retain enough open-endedness to
frustrate meaningful participation by the litigants. Implicitly in every
case decided on that basis, and more explicitly across a range of cases,
the courts would be required to adjudicate solutions to the same intract-
able problem-"What is a sensible, reasonable family vacation?"---en-
countered in the four-party case considered earlierY
16 Courts have traditionally used similarly narrow bases of review of administrative
action for the very same process reason-to reduce the open-endedness of the problems
brought before them for decision. See K. DAVIS, ADm sTRATnsV LAW TFx §§ 29.01-.07
at 525-38, §§ 30.04-.05 at 549-51 (3d ed. 1972). To the extent that courts adopt narrow
bases of review, they delegate a major part of the responsibility to the extrajudicial decision-
making agencies. To be sure, to the extent that the extrajudicial agencies exercise dis-
cretion, "rule of law" problems may arise. But in our system, fairly wide agency dis-
cretion has long been recognized as a legitimate necessity. See id. at 15-23. Cf. notes
106-10 infra & text accompanying.
17 Passing judgment on the reasonableness of conduct implies a relatively particularized
[Vol. 51:467
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Of course, cases involving the reasonableness of family vacation
plans never actually get into court in our system of law. There are no
generally recognized legal rules, absent contract, upon which family mem-
bers may sue one another over the question of what to do with their
leisure time."8 In effect, our system avoids these potential difficulties by
adopting a "no duty" stance with regard to a wide range of intrafamily
disputes.19 Responsibility has thus been delegated to the heads of house-
holds to exercise managerial authority in making binding decisions re-
garding such matters. To be sure, under some circumstances a wife
may sue her husband for support;2 and a parent's supervision of his
minor children may be suspended or terminated for abandonment or
neglect;21 but the rules traditionally governing such disputes are rela-
tively specific and limited in a way which avoids open-ended questions
such as "What shall we do on our vacation?
22
If one searches for a shorthand way of referring to the problems
which are unsuited to being solved by adjudication, several possibilities
present themselves. A leading writer has referred to them as "poly-
centric," or "many-centered," suggesting the non-linear way in which
the issues in such problems are interrelated.2" Another useful term might
be "open-ended," emphasizing the lack of defined limits upon inquiry
and argument. Or, observing that these problems necessarily involve
the decisionmaker in the processes of planning and design, they might
standard against which to measure that conduct. See W. PRossER, HANDBoox o? T LAw
OF TORTS §37 at 206-07 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAias, TEm LAw oF ToRTs
§ 15.3 at 880-83 (1956); James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negli-
gence Trials, 5 VAD. L. REv. 697 (1952).
18 Professor Clark, in his treatise on domestic relations, explains the reluctance of courts
to enter support decrees when the parties are living together in this way:
Some cases . . . refuse relief . . . on the theory that the courts should not make
decisions for the parties concerning the details of their marital conduct when the
marriage is still a going concern. ... Within limits this reluctance is certainly
sensible. The courts can hardly allow themselves to be drawn into deciding whether
the family budget will cover the purchase of a car or a television set.
H. CLARK, Tnn LAw oF DomrsTic RELAnoNs 3N TiE UNrED STATES § 6.1 at 186 (1968)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).1 9 Cf. pp. 502-05 infra.
20 See H. Cr.AK, supra note 18, §§ 6.1-.7 at 181-218.
2 1 Id. § 18.5 at 629-36.
2 2 For example, to obtain support payments from her husband a woman usually must
prove that they were married, that they are no longer living together but are not divorced,
and that the separation is not due to her own conduct (adultery, desertion, etc.) See H.
CLARK, supra note 18, §§ 6.1-.7 at 181-218. And the rules governing the legal effects of
abandonment and neglect of children are even more narrowly circumscribed. Id. § 18.5
at 629-36.
231 have borrowed the term "polycentri&' from Professor Fuller, See Fuller, supra
notes 2 & 7. It appears that he borrowed the term from Michael Polanyi. See M. PorLArNM,
THE Locac oF LmEry 170-84 (1951), cited in Fuller, supra note 2, at 33 n.26, and Fuller,
supra note 7, at 3.
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usefully be referred to as "planning problems," or "design problems."24
Or finally, returning to the need in adjudication for relatively specific
rules of decision, these problems might be described as "requiring the
exercise of unlimited discretion on the part of the decisionmaker."
This last way of referring to unadjudicable problems deserves fur-
ther comment. Much attention has recently been given in law journals
to defining "discretion" and to exploring the philosophical implications
of its exercise by courts.25 If the term is employed to refer to the power
exercised when any solution, or a wide range of solutions, are permitted
by the established rules, 28 then by definition a court must exercise dis-
cretion in attempting to solve a polycentric problem. Obviously, the dis-
tinction between decision-by-rule and decision-by-discretion is a matter
of degree; the less specific and more general the rule, the greater the
need for the exercise of discretion. From this, two important points
follow: First, there is probably no such thing as a problem-even a
classically legal problem-without a certain amount of open-endedness.
Thus, it is inevitable, and no doubt desirable, that to some extent courts
exercise discretion in deciding legal problems of even the most formalistic
varietyY. What we are concerned with here are problems which tend
toward the extreme on the scale of open-ended polycentricity--i.e., cases
in which the dominant mode of decision is the exercise of discretion.
And second, even with regard to highly polycentric problems, the
point is that adjudication is ill-suited to solving them, not that it is abso-
lutely incapable of doing so. When pressured, courts can react in some
fashion or other to the most open-ended problems. The important thing
to recognize is that whenever courts yield to such pressures, the parties
affected by the decisions are, in proportion to the extent to which the
problems are open-ended, denied the opportunity to participate meaning-
fully in the decision process. Moreover, it must be recognized that this
denial of the opportunity to participate strikes at the very heart of the
integrity of adjudication. If it recurs routinely, the judicial system itself
may be threatened. When asked, cajoled, and finally forced to try to
solve unadjudicable problems, courts will inevitably respond in the only
24 For an extended application of these principles to the field of product design lia-
bility see Henderson, supra note 2.
25 See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 14 (1967); Greenawalt,
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75
CoLuM. L. REv. 359 (1975); Morawetz, Commentary: The Rules of Law and the Point
of Law, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (1973).
28 See Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 268.
2 7 It has been argued philosophically that all rules, however formal, require some "fill-
ing in" at the law application stage. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. Rzv. 630, 661-69 (1958).
[Vol. 51:467
DEVELOPMENTS IN TORTS
manner possible-they will begin exercising managerial authority and
the discretion that goes with it. Attempts will be made to disguise the
substitution, to preserve appearances, but the process which evolves
should (and no doubt eventually will) be recognized for what it is-
not adjudication, but an elaborate, expensive masquerade.
II. EXPANDING THE NEGLIGENCE CONCEPT:
RETREAT FROM THE RULE OF LAW
If I have succeeded in demonstrating the need for relatively specific
rules of decision as prerequisites to adjudicability, then my objective in
the analysis which follows ought to be fairly obvious to anyone familiar
with the developments in tort law in recent years. Gradually, step-by-
step, the traditional limitations upon liability in negligence, which gave
sufficient specificity to the negligence concept to allow it to be the sub-
ject of adjudication, have been eliminated. With increasing frequency,
courts have abandoned traditional doctrines and have embraced the idea
of a single, unified, most general principle upon which to determine lia-
bility. Many torts scholars and commentators have encouraged and
praised these developments. I do not. Consistent with the foregoing
analysis of the limits of adjudication, I submit that this judicial expan-
sion and purification of the negligence concept has proceeded to the
point where courts are beginning routinely to confront the sorts of open-
ended, polycentric problems described above. As a consequence, the in-
tegrity of the judicial process in these cases is very much threatened.
I do not use the word "threatened" lightly. If anything, it understates
the level of my concern. If the developments to which I refer continue
unchecked, I doubt seriously that our common law system of negligence-
based liability will survive to the end of this century.
In the sections which follow, I shall trace the major elements in the
expansion of the negligence concept, beginning with an analysis of the
ways in which traditional negligence doctrines have allowed courts to
cope with potential difficulties and ending with a description of the role
of torts scholarship in encouraging the potentially destructive develop-
ments of recent years. Before turning to this task, I should like to em-
phasize that I have no quarrel with judicial law reform,2" as such, nor
are my objections to what is happening based upon disagreement with
the substantive social goals reflected in recent developments. Instead,
my concern is directed at the form these recent reforms have taken--.e.,
the particular means chosen to achieve the social objectives-and the
28 See note 5 supra.
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very real threat to the adjudicative process presented by its being asked
to perform tasks which are clearly beyond its capabilities. The simple
truth which has escaped attention in recent years is that courts are not
capable of solving our society's problems, including problems of risk
management, without substantial formal guidance from the law. We
torts people will continue to ignore this fact only at our peril.
A. The Role of Traditional Doctrine in Rendering
the Negligence Concept Adjudicable
Implicit in the foregoing statements of my thesis is a recognition
that judicial implementation of the negligence concept is not necessarily,
in and of itself, a bad idea. To be sure, the issue of whether a particular
defendant's conduct was "reasonable under the circumstances" is pre-
cisely the type of issue which, potentially at least, threatens courts with
open-ended, polycentric problems that are beyond their capacity to solve.
However, courts have, until the recent acceleration of the expansionary
trend referred to above, managed to cope fairly well with the potential
diffculties associated with the negligence concept, and have kept the levels
of polycentricity in negligence cases within tolerable limits. To better un-
derstand the manner in which recent developments and reforms threaten
the integrity of the torts process, it is necessary to consider the meth-
ods by which, until recently, the negligence concept has been rendered
adjudicable.
Two techniques have been developed and used by courts to cope
with the potential difficulties posed by the negligence concept. On the
one hand, in cases involving the individual conduct of "the man in the
street" in his arm's length relations with others in the society, courts
have relied heavily upon two institutions which have, as a consequence,
come to occupy a centrally important position in this area of the law:
the reasonable man test and the lay jury. Given the nontechnical nature
of the issues presented in these cases, the moralistic, flesh-and-blood
qualities of the reasonable man have provided an adequate vehicle with
which to bring a semblance of order to the task of addressing the poly-
centric question of what modes of conduct individual members of society
have a right to expect from one another.2' And the collective jury ver-
dict, reached in secret and rendered without explanation, is ideally suited
to disguising and submerging the analytical difficulties encountered in
29 In the terms employed in the present analysis, the litigants and the decision maker,
often the jury, conjure up a vehicle for the hypothetical exercise of either managerial au-
thority or contract negotiation. See note 7 supra & text accompanying. See generally James,
The Qualities oj the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rv. 1 (1951).
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applying so general a concept as "reasonableness" to the facts of par-
ticular cases. 0 Admittedly, this combined technique of couching argu-
ment in terms of how a hypothetical reasonable person would or would
not have acted, and then turning the ultimate question of liability over
to a jury, depends for its success upon its ability to hide from view,
rather than to confront and solve, the polycentricity in these cases. 1
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that in the negligence cases in which
content is given to the reciprocal duty of reasonable care owed generally
by individuals in our society, the difficulties have not proven insur-
mountable.
However, there are limits to the effectiveness of this sort of judi-
cial sleight of hand. Inevitably, cases arise in which a complicating
factor makes it unmanageably awkward to purport to ask how a reason-
able person in the defendant's position would or would not have acted.
As will be developed in subsequent discussions, these factors fall within
three basic categories: (1) the evaluation of a particular defendant's
conduct may require an unusually complex, highly technical analysis;
(2) the parties may be in a special relationship which must be taken into
account by modifying the duties each owes to the other; and (3) prac-
tical considerations may compel courts to place limits upon the extent of
potential liability for certain types of conduct. Whatever the complicat-
ing factor in a given case, the characteristic common to all is that the
technique traditionally employed in cases involving the application of
the general duty of reasonable care to arm's length transactions between
strangers-i.e., obscuring the analytical difficulties by positing a hypo-
thetical reasonable person and letting the jury decide on the basis of its
collective intuition-will not work. The presence of the complicating
factor and the explicit recognition that it be taken into account make it
much more difficult to hide the reality that the court is being asked to
plan social relations on a case-by-case basis. Given the polycentric nature
of that planning task, meaningful adversary argument would be difficult,
30 The survival of the jury in negligence cases undoubtedly reflects satisfaction with the
input of laymen's intuition in the decision process. See generally Allen, Learned and Un-
learned Reason, 36 Junm. REv. 254 (1924); Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,
72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924).
3 l The fact that legal standards tend to be thought of as minimum standards probably
helps to reduce the open-endedness of the negligence issue somewhat. But as long as im-
plementation of the negligence concept requires the balancing of the utility and risk asso-
ciated with defendant's conduct under all the circumstances of each particular case (see
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)), the issue retains
sufficient polycentricity to necessitate such judicial sleight of hand.
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if not impossible; and the reliance interests typically at stake are too
important to be left to decision by intuition, or by whim.82
Therefore, courts have traditionally employed a different technique
in this second category of negligence cases. Unable and unwilling to
hide the open-endedness procedurally, courts have sought to avoid it
substantively by introducing sufficient specificity into the rules govern-
ing liability to render the cases adjudicable. Thus, the issue for decision
is not whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable under all the
circumstances, but whether the requirements of relatively specific, formal
rules of decision are satisfied. These rules share the functional charac-
teristic of all common-law rules of liability--that of screening out poly-
centricity and rendering legal controversies adjudicable.
Although we will be exploring them in greater detail in the next
section, it will be helpful to consider briefly a few concrete examples of
the ways in which courts have modified the negligence concept to render
it adjudicable. Perhaps the best example of a case recognized by courts
from the beginning to involve potentially threatening levels of polycen-
tricity is that involving the alleged negligence of a physician rendering
treatment. Clearly, the question of whether or not a particular mode of
medical treatment meets the general requirement of reasonable care pre-
sents a technically complex, open-ended, and unadjudicable planning
problem. Equally clearly, the difficulties could not successfully be ob-
scured by positing a "reasonably prudent doctor" and asking the mem-
bers of the jury to negotiate or intuit their way to a sensible result.
Therefore, courts have adopted a rule of liability which eliminates the
potential open-endedness in malpractice cases by providing a great deal
of specificity. Traditionally, defendant doctors have not been judged
on the basis of whether their conduct was "unreasonable," or "inconsis-
tent with the interests of society," but on the basis of whether their
treatment failed to conform to the recognized custom of their profes-
sion." Thus, the open-ended task of planning reasonable medical care
is not attempted in court, but is delegated to the collective managerial
authority of the medical profession.
32 Admittedly, this point about the importance of the reliance interests detracts some-
what from the neutrality of my position that denial of the litigants' right to participate is,
in and of itself, an unjustifiable perversion of the judicial process. However, I raise it here
because it helps to underscore the practical, as well as the theoretical, implications of my
thesis to torts lawyers and scholars. If the integrity of adjudication is routinely compro-
mised, those adversely affected will undoubtedly move to replace it with some more honest
and efficient mode of resolving disputes.
33 See note 68 infra & text accompanying. Cf. the earlier discussion of the possible use
of custom as a means of rendering the "family vacation" dispute adjudicable. See note
11 supra.
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The clearest example of a formal modification of the general duty
of reasonable care being prompted by a special relationship between the
parties, in the absence of technical complexity, is the traditional judicial
reaction to negligence actions brought by one close family member
against another. For example, when a young child brings an action
against his parents alleging them to have negligently caused him harm
in the course of their exercising parental supervision, the court is con-
fronted with the necessity of weighing the special factor of the parties'
relationship in reaching a decision. To be sure, if the court were will-
ing to treat the case as one involving the arm's length interaction of
strangers, no particular problem would be presented. But given the
parent-child relationship, no such willingness can be expected. In effect,
the court is being asked to adjudicate a solution to the problem of what
sort of behavior can properly be demanded of parents who must balance
the physical well-being of their children against the concomitant need
to exert discipline and encourage development. Not surprisingly, courts
have traditionally refused to address such a polycentric issue in the
course of implementing the negligence concept. However, in contrast
to the technique employed in the medical malpractice cases, in intrafamily
negligence actions courts have simply refused altogether to attempt to
adjudicate solutions to these problems of intrafamily responsibilities-
parents have traditionally been granted immunity from liability to their
minor children for allegedly negligent conduct.3 4 In this way, by adopt-
ing a specific rule of decision immunizing parents from negligence-based
liability to their children, the task of planning reasonable parental super-
vision is not attempted in court, but instead is delegated to the mana-
gerial authority of individual parents.
These examples of how courts have traditionally avoided the threats
of open-endedness in implementing the negligence concept are illustra-
tive only. We shall return to examine them more closely, together with
examples of courts placing limits upon the extent of potential liability,
in the following section. What I have sought to accomplish thus far is
to present an overview of the law of negligence as it existed prior to
the recent developments of concern in this article, and to suggest that
much of the formal content of traditional negligence law is as explain-
able in terms of the necessity of courts avoiding polycentric problems as
it is explainable in terms of the desirability of courts furthering the sub-
stantive objectives of society. Obviously, judicial avoidance of poly-
centricity is not the only explanation for the parameters of traditional
34 See note 114 infra & text accompanying.
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negligence law-presumably, these limitations upon the general negli-
gence concept-e.g., the rules governing the liability of doctors to their
patients and parents to their children-would not have been adopted if
they had not been perceived by courts to further the interests of society
in regulating, and often encouraging, the types of conduct to which they
are applied. But I submit that the relative formality of those exceptions
was dictated to no less extent by the necessity to avoid trying to adjudi-
cate answers on a case by case basis to questions such as "How should
doctors practice medicine?" and "How should parents handle their chil-
dren?" Consistent with the earlier analysis of the limits of adjudica-
tion, courts were required to adopt formal exceptions to, and modifica-
tions of, the general duty of reasonable care in order to render manage-
able the negligence concept in a broad range of cases in which the
unadjudicability of the issues presented could not be hidden by proce-
dural sleight of hand.
To be sure, not all traditional negligence doctrines serve the func-
tion of insulating courts from the potentially destructive open-endedness
of helping to plan a rational society in the context of case-by-case adju-
dication of torts disputes. The rule of charitable immunity,85 for exam-
ple, would appear to serve entirely the substantive objective of subsidiz-
ing the activities of charitable organizations-there is no technological
complexity, special relationship, or need to establish practical limits upon
potential liability which differentiates conduct on behalf of charity from
other types of conduct.8 6 But the charitable immunity rule is unique in
this respect. Behind most, if not all, of the other traditional limitations
upon the general negligence concept lurk problems of social planning
whose potential open-endedness would seriously threaten the integrity
of the judicial process had those limitations, or others of equal formality,
not been recognized. In the following section we will examine some of
the more significant case law reforms by which traditional negligence
doctrines are being abandoned, and explore in greater detail the impli-
cations of these developments to the continued vitality of the common
law torts process.
B. Recent Case Law Developments
Before proceeding to explore the major case law developments of
recent years, it will be worthwhile to reflect momentarily upon the reasons
88 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 133 at 992-96 (4th
ed. 1971).8 6 1t must be recognized that conduct on behalf of charity may pose a greater than
normal incidence of potential difficulties because it tends coincidentally to involve the de-
livery of medical services (see pp. 491-95), or governmental functions (see pp. 505-10
infra).
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for these fundamental changes. Obviously, they reflect a shift in social
and judicial attitudes regarding the proper objectives to be served by
our liability system. If, as some have argued, one of the increasingly
dominant social objectives of our negligence system is compensating the
victims of accidents,3 7 it is probably inevitable that the traditional formal
exceptions, the substantive effects of which were to deny recovery in a
range of cases to liability in negligence, would eventually come to be
viewed as unjustifiable, antisocial denials of the right of injured plain-
tiffs. At the same time, these expansions of negligence-based liability
undoubtedly reflect an erosion of confidence in the extrajudicial institu-
tions and proctsses to which responsibility for decisions affecting safety
was delegated under traditional tort doctrines." Finally, it must be recog-
nized that these recent developments in the law of negligence reflect what
could be termed an "aesthetic principle" in favor of purification of legal
doctrine for its own sake. 9 Formality in the law implies sacrifice, and is
therefore repugnant to the romantic commitment to "justice in every
case" currently in vogue among torts scholars.4 0
Of course, I am not primarily concerned with the social policy ob-
jectives underlying these recent developments, but rather with the extent
37 The foremost proponent of this theory of compensation has been Professor Fleming
James. His seminal article advancing the thesis, upon which was based much of what fol-
lowed, was Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE
L.J. 549 (1948). Perhaps his clearest statement of the compensation principle appears in
Indemnification, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution of Accident
Losses, 21 NA.C.C.A.L.J. 360-61 (1958).
38 Cf. note 69 infra & text accompanying.
3 9 See generally Cooperrider, A Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 MxcH. L. REv.
1291, 1309-10 (1958).4 0 That this represents the overwhelming bias of torts commentary today should be
obvious to anyone familiar with torts scholarship in recent years. I shall try to document
it at relevant points throughout my analysis. For the present, two brief but typical sam-
ples will suffice. Having rejected the desirability of formal, statutory rules of decision for
environmental disputes, the author of a recent article continues:
What we find when we look at "environmental law," therefore, is a balancing of
competing interests ....
.... The judiciary is the only branch of government capable of this case-by-
case balancing procedure, and thus it is within this branch that any solution to
the problems of environmental law must be based.
Smith, The Environment and the Judiciary: A Need for Co-operation or Reform?, 3 ENv.
AxpAIRS 627, 638-39 (1974). And a similar abhorrence for rigid formality prompted the
author of a recent article espousing a case-by-case treatment of fright without impact cases
to conclude:
[It has been argued that] to permit others than the one imperilled to recover for
nervous shock or mental distress would open up a Pandora's box of litigation ....
This cry has been raised against every innovation in tort litigation. It is an insult
to the whole judicial process dedicated as it is to the winnowing of true claims
from false ones.
Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48
TuL. L. REv. 782, 791 (1974).
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to which they threaten the integrity of the adjudicative process. It will
be recalled that the negligence concept poses serious difficulties for courts
in three basic situations: (1) where an evaluation of the defendant's
conduct requires an assessment of complex technology; (2) where an
evaluation of the defendant's conduct requires defining the contours of
special relationships; and (3) where practical limits must be placed upon
the extent of potential liability. In the sections which follow, I shall offer
several examples of recent reforms in each of these categories. It should
be borne in mind that these developments have received widespread at-
tention from torts scholars and have been the subject of considerable
commentary. Therefore, I shall avoid the duplication of effort involved
in exhaustively tracing these reforms step by step from their inception.
Instead, I shall assume a basic familiarity with the subject areas to be
examined, and direct my efforts toward accomplishing a shift in per-
spective that will enable the reader to view familiar things in a new and
different way.
1. Where Evaluation of the Defendant's Conduct
Requires an Assessment of Complex Technology
These are by far the most dramatic examples of the kinds of diffi-
culties courts encounter when they try to adjudicate solutions to open-
ended, polycentric planning problems. No other areas of tort law today
pose more serious threats to the integrity of the judicial process than
those which follow in this section.
a. Products Liability
It is appropriate to begin our exploration of recent developments
here, because a famous products liability decision marked the beginning
of the trend towards expanding and purifying the negligence concept.
The decision to which I refer is MacPherson v. Buick Co.,4 in which
the New York Court of Appeals removed the requirement of privity of
contract in a negligence action brought against the remote manufacturer
by the injured purchaser of a flawed automobile. Whatever may be
said for the social policy objectives supporting the requirement of privity
at its inception,42 from the process perspective the privity rule served
41 217 N.Y. 382, ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 2 See generaly W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF' TE LAWv OF TORTS § 96 at 641-42 (4th ed.
1971). Lord Abinger, in the English decision generally recognized as the source of the
privity rule, emphasized the spectre of limitless liability: "Unless we confine the operation
of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and out-
rageous consequences, to which I see no limit, would ensue." Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).
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the vital function of insulating courts from the necessity of trying to
adjudicate, on a case-by-case basis, answers to the highly polycentric
question, "How much quality control should a reasonable manufacturer
insist upon ?"14 To be sure, as the underlying views of policy shifted
increasingly in favor of protecting consumers during the period preced-
ing MacPherson, the privity rule had become subject to exceptions in a
number of cases.44 However, the significant characteristic of these ex-
ceptions for present purposes was their relative formality--the major
issue in a products liability case during that period was not how much
quality control was reasonable, but whether or not the product in ques-
tion fell within one or another of the developing subcategories of excep-
tions to the privity rule.
4
"
When then Judge Cardozo in MacPherson removed the privity rule
as an illogical and ill-conceived barrier to product manufacturers' lia-
bility in negligence, he embarked the courts of this country upon a course
of expanding and purifying the law of negligence which continues to
this day. Because industry custom was deemed unacceptable as the stan-
dard against which to judge a defendant's efforts at quality control,4
the period following MacPherson was characterized by substantial ana-
lytical difficulties in implementing the negligence concept in products
liability cases.47 Thus, it was inevitable that the courts would be pres-
43 n theory, the plaintiff in a negligence action involving a flawed product would be
required to show that the defendant's quality control efforts were unreasonable, and there-
fore negligent. The privity rule prevented that issue from being presented.
4 4 Te exceptions, which began with Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (18S2), are
reviewed and analyzed in then judge Cardozo's majority opinion in MacPherson.
4 5 The basis for the exception-i.e., whether a particular product was, as a matter of
law, "imminently dangerous to the lives of others"-served to render more manageable the
issue of the reasonableness of defendants' conduct in these cases. If the court concluded
that the product before it was not "imminently dangerous," the issue of the reasonableness
of the remote seller's conduct was never reached; and in those cases in which an exception
was made, the same facts which supported the exception tended, because they indicated
extreme risk, to render manageable the question of liability. Of course, the issue of whether
the product fell within the exception posed difficulties, which eventually led to its demise
in MacPherson. But I submit that for a time, at least, the "general immunity subject to
relatively specific exceptions" approach did function to render flaw cases more manageable
than would have been the case under a general negligence standard in the absence of the
privity rule.
46See, e.g., The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
4 7 
It is beyond the scope of this article to chronicle these difficulties in any detail.
Basically, they. sprang from the necessity of both sides being required in proof and argu-
ment to address the question of the reasonableness of the corporate defendant's efforts at
quality control. Inevitably, courts began permitting plaintiffs to show negligence
circumstantially, via application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, to the point that courts
were implementing a thinly-veiled strict liability system. This helped to solve the problems
of proof and argument regarding the issue of defendants' negligence, but created analytical
problems of its own. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 CaL 2d 453, 150 P.2d
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sured institutionally to abandon the futile effort to decide these cases
on so open-ended a basis as "reasonable care." Happily, the mounting
social pressures in favor of greater consumer protection coincided with
this institutional imperative, and in an astonishingly short time the
courts effectively replaced negligence with privity-free strict liability in
tort as the basis for manufacturers' liability for harm caused by flawed
products. 48
Nothing more clearly reflects the neutrality of the process princi-
ples herein advanced than the developments just described. Although
the rule of strict manufacturers' liability is at the opposite end of the
social policy spectrum from the strict immunity afforded manufacturers
by the privity rule, both share the important feature of insulating courts
from polycentric problems. From the present perspective of the limits
of adjudication, the system is blind to the politics of whether plaintiffs
win or lose in these cases. However, what cannot be ignored from this
perspective is the imperative that courts avoid trying to decide cases
involving flawed consumer products on so vague a standard as the
"reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under all the circumstances."
Thus, instead of allowing the negligence concept to flower to maturity
by freeing it from irrational impediments, MacPherson actually doomed
the negligence concept in products liability cases involving flawed con-
sumer products by exposing courts to problems which they could not
solve.49
Of course, the development of strict liability in cases involving
flawed products is, in a manner of speaking, a "success story." To be
sure, the law of negligence could not cope with the aftermath of Mac-
Pherson; but the more manageable concept of strict liability was quickly
436 (1944). For a description of the lines of development of circumstantial proof in these
cases, see Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L.
REv. 675 (1963). Both Keeton and Prosser (the latter, in his famous pair of articles on
the subject-see note 50 injra) suggest that, given these developments, juries had no diffi-
culty in most cases with the issue of reasonable care. However, their conclusion is consis-
tent with my thesis, in that juries (with the tacit approval of judges) had simply con-
verted the negligence system into one of strict liability. In principle, however, such a
masquerade must be condemned as lawless, in that juries were still free, in theory, to re-
turn verdicts for defendants. Cf. note 81 infra & text accompanying. See also Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 543, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring).48 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) and The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MiNN. L. Rav. 791 (1966).
49 Of course, I do not intend to disclaim the important role of substantive social
policies in this process of reform. For a thoughtful survey of the various public policy
bases for strict products liability see McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications,
38 U. Cm. L. REv. 3 (1970). If I tend to emphasize the role of process in these develop-
ments, it is because this aspect has so long been overlooked.
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developed to take its place. Unfortunately, this happy ending may be
unique to products cases involving manufacturers' liability for harm
caused by flaws. In the other great area of products liability, involving
products that are dangerous because of the manner in which they are
designed and marketed, the relative reasonableness of the risks presented
appears to be the only socially acceptable basis upon which to determine
liability.50 Therefore, given the social imperative that liability for product
design and marketing be determined on the basis of reasonableness,
courts have been compelled to develop traditional limitations upon and
modifications of the negligence concept as a means of avoiding process
difficulties. For example, courts have traditionally insisted upon full
disclosure of hidden risks in implementing the failure to warn doctrine,
thereby avoiding the necessity of asking whether a given manufacturer
might justify nondisclosure on a "best interests of society" basis.51
5 OAbsolute manufacturers' liability for risks of harm associated with product designs
has been rejected unanimously, see Henderson, supra note 2, at 1554, together with the
adoption of industry custom as the standard against which to measure defendant's respon-
sibilities, id. at 1556-57. Traditionally, product designs and the marketing thereof must be
found to be unreasonably dangerous before liability will be imposed. See, e.g., Colosimo v.
May Dept. Store Co., 466 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1972). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment i. (1965). To be sure, a growing number of courts appear to be re-
jecting the "unreasonably dangerous" limitation in § 402A. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123
N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). For a collection of recent cases see Kiely, The Art
of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Casis: Some Thoughts on Llewellyn's The
Common Law Tradition, 24 DEPAUL L. RIv. 914, 931 n.68 (1975). However, it is clear
from these cases that the courts are not moving to absolute liability for design risks, and
will continue to implement some form or other of reasonableness as the basis of manufac-
turers' liability for allegedly defective design. Cf. notes 61-64 infra & text accompanying.
A possible alternative to "reasonableness" as the standard against which to measure
defectiveness might be "consumer expectations." This appears to have been a standard
adopted in Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967): "[Products]
should be strong enough to perform as the ordinary consumer expects." 248 Ore. at 474,
435 P.2d at 809. However, in almost every instance the concept of expectations is employed
as one of "reasonable expectations, and thus becomes merely another way of phrasing the
basic test of reasonableness. See, e.g., PmTATE:ENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A, comments
g & i (1965).51 In Larson v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), the court stated
the full-disclosure principle as follows:
If, because of the alleged undisclosed defect in design of the 1963 Corvair steer-
ing assembly, an extra hazard is created over and above the normal hazard, General
Motors should be liable for this unreasonable hazard. Admittedly, it would not sell
many cars of this particular model if its sales "pitch" included the cautionary state-
ment that the user is subjected to an extra hazard or unreasonable risk in the event
of a head-on collision. But the duty of reasonable care should command a warning
of this latent defect that could under certain circumstances accentuate the possi-
bility of severe injury.
Id. at 505-06. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 1558-62. Two recent decisions
appear to have flirted with the idea of allowing a "nondisclosure benefits society" argument
on behalf of defendants. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) and Davis v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1968). However, these were unusual cases on their facts (drugs distributed by health offi-
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Moreover, courts have adopted a number of formal limitations upon
liability for unsafe design, including the patent danger rule, 2 the in-
tended purpose doctrine," and the bystander rule. 4 As has been pointed
out in previous discussions, the most important function served by these
formal limitations from our present perspective is not that of furthering
the fortunes of products manufacturers, but rather of insulating the
courts from problems which would otherwise threaten to engulf them
in a morass of social planning. With these doctrinal limitations, courts
have managed to cope with the potential difficulties in cases involving
product design and marketing by delegating major responsibility for
decisions regarding product design safety to the give-and-take negotia-
tions of the marketplace;55 without such limitations, faced with the
necessity on a case by case basis of adjudicating answers to the ques-
tion "How much design safety is enough?", the courts would con-
front chaos.
Unfortunately, chaos may be upon us. The source of the difficul-
ties should, by now, be obvious. The same social policy pressures favor-
ing consumer protection which earlier pressured courts to adopt strict
liability for flaw-caused harm are now pressuring courts to abandon
the traditional limitations upon negligence-based liability for dangerous
product design and marketing. Step by step, the negligence principle
governing liability for dangerous product design is being expanded and
purified, and courts are beginning routinely to address the problem of
reasonable product design armed with no more specific guide to decision
cials during mass immunization program), and the actual holdings are consistent with the
full disclosure position. C. note 74 infra & text accompanying.
52The leading case supporting the rule that there is no liability for injuries caused by
an obviously dangerous condition is Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802
(1950). See also Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973). See gen-
erally Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturere' Liability for
Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1065 (1973).5 3The rule is that manufacturers are not liable for harm resulting from unintended use
of their products. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966);
Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
4 The rule that prevented bystanders (i.e., persons other than users and consumers of
the product) from recovering originated in flaw cases. See, e.g., Mull v. Ford Motor Co.,
368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 126 N.W.2d 350
(1964); Rodriguez v. Shell's; City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1962). See generally
Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. REv. 1
(1970). Cf. RESTATE XENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment o (1965). The importance of
the bystander rule in design cases inheres in the fact that bystanders are among the most
sympathetic class of plaintiffs from a policy standpoint. Therefore, had the rule not been
recognized, bystanders would have placed severe pressures upon courts to address the issue
of reasonable design. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1567, 1573.
5 To some extent, design decisions are reached by manufacturers' exercise of mana-
gerial authority. For doubts concerning the adequacy of marketplace negotiations as a
protection of consumer interests see FiNAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CoinssioN ON
PRODUCT SAFETY 63-72 (1970).
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than "what is in the best interests of society." 6  To be sure, not all
jurisdictions have joined in this trend,57 and there are reasons for be-
lieving that it may not be irreversible. 58  But courts have already aban-
doned enough in the way of traditional doctrine, 59 and sufficient num-
bers of torts writers have praised and encouraged these developments,"
to give rise to the concerns which have prompted the present analysis.
The real difficulty in these product design cases, which distinguishes
them from eases involving product flaws, is the unavailability of a work-
able, relatively mechanical definition of "defect." Unlike the flaw cases,
in which the question of whether a particular product was flawed is not
15 6 The cases are collected in Henderson, supra note 2, at 1565-66 nn.145-47. A recent
count of jurisdictions on the important question of unreasonable automobile design will be
found in Fredricks v. General Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd 384
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968). That the guide to decision
suggested in the text is the true basis of liability in these cases is reflected in the following
formulation in one of the leading design liability cases, Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.
3d 465, 476, 467 P.2d 229, 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1970): "Whether the [product]
was unreasonably dangerous due to faulty design ...is clearly a question of fact to be
determined by the jury." Cf. note 50 supra.
57 The cases are collected in Henderson, supra note 2, at 1561-62 nn.123, 124, 126-29.
See also Fredricks v. General Motors Corp., 261 F.Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd 384 F.2d
802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
581 have in mind decisions such as Dreisostok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066 (4th Cir. 1974), and Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973), in
which the courts recognized in principle the existence of a common-law duty to adhere
to a general standard of reasonableness in auto design, yet denied liability as a matter of
]aw. See J. HENDERsON, JR. & R. PEmaSoN, Tbm TORTS PRocEss 648-49 (1975). It may
be possible, in time, for more specific rules of decision to be developed with which to cope
with the potential difficulties in these product design cases. If this common-law process of
rule development should take place, then the present period of difficulties may be viewed
as temporary.
59 Thus, the patent danger rule has been thrown over in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.,
2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); the intended purpose rule has been
abandoned in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); and the by-
stander rule has been scuttled in Elmore v. American Motors, 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,
75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
6ORegarding the demise of the patent danger rule see, e.g., Marshall, supra note 52;
Comment, The Open and Obvious Nature of a Design Defect Does Not Necessarily Preclude
Manufacturer's Liability, 49 TmcAs L. Rbv. 591 (1971); Comment, Strict Liability in Tort
Based on Defective Design, 1970 WAst. L.Q. 359. Regarding the demise of the intended
purpose doctrine in the important field of automobile design, see, e.g., Katz, Liability of
Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. Rnv. 863
(1956); Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Cana. L. Rav. 645
(1967); Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design, 52 IowA L. Rav. 953 (1967);
Note, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 299 (1969); Note, Products Liability-Duty of Care in Automobile Design--Fitness
for Collision, 21 S.CL. REv. 451 (1969). And regarding the demise of the bystander rule,
see, e.g., Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN.
L. REv. 1 (1970); Note, Torts-Strict Liability: Protection for the Bystander in Products
Cases, 26 Aax. L. REv. 106 (1972): Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A
Study in Common Law Determination, 38 U. Cna. L. Rzv. 625 (1971); Comment, The
Bystander's Liberation Front-U.C.C. § 2-318 or Strict Liability?, 19 U. KAx. L. RE-v.
251 (1971).
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particularly open-ended or analytically troublesome,6 ' design cases re-
quire the courts to apply the core concept of "reasonableness under all
the circumstances" in determining whether any given product design
is defective.0 2 Whether or not the courts admit that they are deciding
these cases on negligence principles,63 that is essentially what they are
doing. 4 Efforts are made to obscure the analytical difficulties of such
a task. Typically, expert witnesses are called by both sides to elaborate
extensively, but in essentially conclusory terms, upon how and why a
particular product design is or is not defective. 5 But in the end, given
the impossibly open-ended task they are asked to perform, triers of fact
are left to reach their decisions by collective intuition, or emotion, or
whim.
Thus, unable to seek refuge in a rule of strict liability, and increas-
ingly unable to hide the lack of principle in these cases behind the tradi-
tional smokescreens of conclusory expert testimony and general jury
verdicts, courts are floundering. To be sure, more and more injured
plaintiffs are recovering higher and higher judgments, and most torts
writers on the subject have encouraged and praised the developments of
which I speak. But the costs in terms of sacrifices of judicial integrity
of achieving these political objectives must be, and are, enormous. No
sensitive student of the legal process can observe the trial of a product
6 The proof of defect in these cases may be very complex and difficult, but the avail-
ability of a built-in, specific standard-i.e, the product design and its intended purpose-
against which to measure the individual product all but eliminates open-endedness and
polycentricity.
62 Where the design itself is attacked as defective, there is no built-in standard against
which to judge the product. Instead, the courts must measure the defendant's design against
some hypothetical standard of reasonableness. Cf. Henderson, supra note 2, at 1547.
6 3 The cases which represent the clearest repudiation of the applicability of negligence
concepts are those which have refused to include the "unreasonably dangerous" language
in their versions of RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). The cases following
Cronin are collected in Kiely, The Art of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases:
Some Thoughts on Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition, 24 Da PAUL L. Rxv. 914, 931
n.68 (1975).
64 For a recent survey of the literature on this point, together with the conclusion that
"looked at from the practical trial level of what must be done, the plaintiff must prove a
negligence case," see Kiely, supra note 63, at 929 n.58 & text accompanying.
651 have described these efforts in some detail in Henderson, supra note 2, at 1558,
1569-71. Ci. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1303 (1974); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher,
Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQusSNE L. REv. 425
(1974). Although these authors disagree with me regarding the root cause of the difficulties
being encountered at trial in these product design cases, they agree with the accuracy of
my description of what is going on. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use
and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age,
61 CoRNL L. REv. 495 (1976).
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design liability case conducted on such a basis without becoming sickened
at heart.60
b. Medical Malpractice
I shall begin my analysis of recent developments in the medical
malpractice field by disclaiming any intent to argue here that the so-
called "malpractice crisis" is a direct consequence of the expansion and
purification of the negligence concept in medical malpractice cases. I do
submit that some, at least, of the recent modifications of the negligence
concept in malpractice cases constitute no less a retreat from the rule of
law than similar modifications in cases involving manufacturers' lia-
bility for unsafe product designs; and that such abandonments of prin-
ciple, should they continue, will exacerbate the adverse conditions which
may have produced a crisis in the first place. But I have insufficient data
upon which to conclude that the developments which I shall examine
here are a substantial cause of the predicament in which doctors currently
find themselves. 67  One reason for my hesitation in this regard is the
fact that judicial expansion and purification of the negligence concept in
medical malpractice cases is far less advanced than analogous develop-
ments in the other areas under consideration in this section. In the fields
of products liability and environmental protection, for example, one can
demonstrate a pronounced trend in the direction of liberalizing and ex-
panding the conceptual bases of liability. In the medical malpractice
field, in contrast, the developments are far less advanced. Perhaps be-
cause of a tacit judicial recognition of the growing crisis to which refer-
ence has been made, courts have not as yet succumbed in significant
numbers to the temptation of trying independently to adjudicate an-
swers to the question "What constitutes reasonable medical care?"
66 1 am not completely alone in my assessment of the breakdown of integrity in some
of the recent product design liability cases. See, e.g., Weinstein, Twerski, PiehIer & Donaher,
Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQUENsu L. Rxv. 425
(1974); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Lia-
bility Litigation, 52 TExAs L. Rzv. 1303 (1974). Although these authors and I are in sub-
stantial disagreement regarding the source of the difficulties in these cases (see Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design
Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976) and Henderson,
Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 541 (1976), we agree that such
breakdowns are occurring.
67 Indeed, it is unnecessary for present purposes to assume that a "crisis" exists. If a
crisis does exist, it is probably caused by factors other than the increasing willingness of
courts to face polycentric problems. These factors may include a decrease in the public
trust and confidence in doctors: a growing claims consciousness of the part of everyone
in society, including medical patients; and significant increases in the quantity of doctor-
patient contacts over recent years. See generally Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 51 ImD. LJ. 528, 537-38 rn. 50-53 & text accompanying, infra.
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As was suggested in an earlier introductory section, the major tech-
nique by which courts traditionally have avoided polycentric problems
in the medical malpractice area has been the judicial adoption of the
custom of the profession as the standard against which to judge the
conduct of individual doctors. Instead of asking whether the medical
treatment given by a particular defendant was reasonable under all the
circumstances, courts have asked the far less open-ended, and therefore
more manageable, question of whether the defendant's conduct con-
formed to the customary standards of his profession.6" Although ex-
planations for this position have traditionally stressed such factors as
the need to encourage doctors in the free exercise of their best judg-
ment69 and the reality that jurors are not technically competent to under-
stand complicated medical techniques,70 I submit that the institutional
imperative of avoiding polycentric problems is no less a factor support-
ing traditional judicial reliance upon professional custom in medical mal-
practice cases.
Interestingly, many of the recent judicial reforms which have in-
creased doctors' exposure to malpractice liability have not, to any sig-
nificant extent, exposed courts to the open-ended problems of principal
concern here. For example, the abandonment in recent years of the rule
which measured a doctor's conduct by the professional custom in his
locality has not, at least in theory, exposed courts to polycentric prob-
lems due to the fact that courts have continued to look to the custom of
a wider medical community for the specific standards upon which to
determine liability.71 Similarly, the willingness of some courts to ex-
pand doctors' liability in contract, based upon promises to cure, does not
in theory threaten judicial integrity because the formal requirements of
contract law presumably must be satisfied in such cases.72 And the same
conclusion may be reached regarding the recent extensions of liability
for failing to inform patients of the risks of submitting to treatment.
Although some jurisdictions have refused to give effect to medical cus-
tom in deciding the issue of informed consent,73 they have adopted a
6 8 See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Ray.
549, 558-69 (1959).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 607-08.
71 For a thorough treatment of the traditional locality rule see id. at 569-75. Decisions
abandoning the locality rule include Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793
(1968) and Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
72 See, e.g., Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
73For treatments of the traditional use of custom in cases involving informed consent,
see Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FoRanAm L. REV. 639 (1968); Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970). The leading
decision abandoning reliance upon custom in such cases is Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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rule of full disclosure which serves equally well in theory to eliminate
the issue of whether a particular doctor's failure to inform his patient
of a material risk was reasonable under all of the circumstances.7'
Of course, thus far we have spoken of the theoretical effects of
these developments. Is it possible that, as a matter of practical reality,
these reforms in the rules governing malpractice liability are exposing
courts to open-ended problems beyond their capacity to solve? A satis-
factory answer here is difficult in the absence of more definite data. For
example, it is possible that the shift from "custom of the local medical
community" to "custom of the national medical community" might pro-
duce greater uncertainty regarding the content of the applicable stan-
dard, and thus might present the practical necessity of the court deciding
which, among competing standards, was the more reasonable. And it is
equally possible that courts, in implementing a more plaintiff-oriented
approach to the issues of contract to cure and disclosure of risks, might
allow juries to read promises into contracts where none existed75 and
to find failures to disclose where none occurred. But in the absence of
data showing this to be occurring routinely, I am willing to assume that
these developments do not substantially threaten the integrity of the
judicial process.7
74 The full disclosure rule imposed in these malpractice cases is very analogous to the
full disclosure rule in products liability-warning cases. See note 51 supra & text accom-
panying. The standard for disclosure in malpractice cases was described in Canterbury v.
Spence as follows:
In our view, the patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses
enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's
communication to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and
that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determin-
ing whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's
decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision nust be unmasked. (Emphasis
added.)
464 F.2d at 786-87. Thus, the test is not whether a failure to inform was reasonable, but
whether such a failure in fact occurred. To be sure, the issue of "materiality to the pa-
tient's decision" will require the exercise of judgment by courts in these cases, but it will
be decided along a single value axis-"the patient's right of self-decision"--rather than the
cluster of value axes presented by any test such as "the good of society." Cf. Reyes v. Wyeth
Labs, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v.
Wyeth Labs, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). Thus, although the failure to inform
issue may be difficult in close cases, it will not be unmanageably polycentric.
75For a criticism of recent developments on this ground, see generally Tierney, Con-
tractual Aspects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457 (1973); Note, Express Contracts
to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50 IND. L.J. 361 (1975).
76 That is, I am willing to assume that the courts are adhering to the rules of decision
as they exist. If the present inquiry were to be opened up generally to the sorts of break-
downs-in-application suggested here, no area of tort law-or law, in general-would be
immune from scrutiny. In the interests of keeping the present analysis manageable, I have
chosen to focus attention almost exclusively upon the threat to judicial integrity inhering
in lack of rule formalism.
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A more serious threat to judicial integrity is posed by the recent
expansion in several jurisdictions of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in
medical malpractice cases. Courts in a few states have held that the
plaintiff may reach the jury upon proof that he has suffered a rare ad-
verse result from treatment, notwithstanding uncontroverted proof that
the defendant doctor conformed to the customary standards of his pro-
fession. 7  To be sure, the issue for decision in such a case remains the
same, at least theoretically-i.e., whether the defendant conformed to
the standard of the medical community.7 But the giving of that issue
to the jury in the absence of any evidence of failure to conform other
than the fact of the adverse consequence would seem to countenance
decisions by whim in such cases.
79
The clearest threat to the integrity of the judicial process in the
medical malpractice field is posed by the decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington in Helling v. Carey,80 in which the court held as a matter
of law that the professional custom to which the defendant doctors
clearly conformed was unreasonable. The source of the threat is clear:
in allowing independent judicial review of medical custom, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court appears to have committed the courts of that
state to an active role in the planning and development of medical treat-
ment, a task beyond the capacity of any court system honestly and ra-
tionally to perform. Although the holding in Helling may be limited
to its special facts,8" and although commentators have expressed doubts
regarding its acceptance in the future,82 the decision is significant when
viewed from our present perspective. That even a single high court
could have been persuaded to abandon the security and self-protection
of the rule of professional custom reveals the pervasiveness of the cur-
rent movement towards expansion and purification of the negligence
concept. If Helling should turn out to have initiated a trend in the
77 See, e.g., Cline v. Lund, 31 Cal. App. 3d 755, 107 CaL Rptr. 629 (1973).
78 In Cline v. Lund, the court discusses the admissability of testimony from a medical
pathologist in a way which makes clear that the defendant doctor would be held to the
"proper and requisite degree of skill and care used by practicing physicians in the com-
munity." Id. at 766, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
70 One observor, in an article on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as it is applied in Cali-
fornia medical malpractice cases, came very close to this conclusion when he criticized what
he termed the "misuse" of the doctrine on what I interpret as a "jury's whim" basis: "The
jury, which is not unnaturally sympathetic to the plight of the plaintiff, is the final arbiter."
Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. Ra.V. 1043,
1057 (1962).
80 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
8 1 The opinion in Helling suggests the holding is so limited. See 83 Wash. 2d at 517,
519, 519 P.2d at 982, 983.
82See, e.g., Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. MED. 52 (May 1974); Pearson, The
Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976), infra. But see
Comment, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 55 B.U.L. REv. 647 (1975).
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medical malpractice field, it will be a development which torts lawyers
will one day come to regret.83
c. Environmental Protection
Traditionally, of course, the legal formalities which protected courts
from being required to decide how much can reasonably be expected
in the way of environmental quality were not part of the law of negli-
gence at all. Thus, until fairly recently, the rules governing trespass on
land were more relevant in legal controversies affecting the evironment
than was the concept of reasonable care which plays a central role in
the law of negligence; and the tort doctrines most relevant to environ-
mental controversies-public and private nuisance-were sufficiently dis-
tinct unto themselves to resist being treated as theories of negligence-
based liability. And yet, the inclusion of the present topic in this analy-
sis of the expansion of negligence is justified-indeed, compelled-by
three factors: (1) from our present process perspective, the formal
limitations traditionally placed upon liability in trespass and nuisance
served precisely the same basic function as did the formal limitations
upon negligence-based liability; (2) the recent reforms and expansions
of legal doctrine in the environmental protection field have increasingly
relied upon the basic negligence concept of "reasonableness under all
the circumstances" as a means of achieving independent judicial review
and supervision of a wide range of environment-threatening conduct,
and (3) no other field of tort law today provides clearer examples of
how the abandonment of traditional formalities (whatever their content
doctrinally) exposes courts to unmanageable, unadjudicable problems.
That the doctrines of trespass and nuisance were, indeed, formal
and circumscribed by "depolycentrizing" limitations need not be labored
here. For an action in trespass to lie, the plaintiff has traditionally been
required to show a physical intrusion upon land interfering with his in-
terest in exclusive possession.84 Although a number of privileges are
8 Although it might at first blush appear that torts lawyers, especially the plaintiffs'
bar, would welcome any such expansion of doctors' exposure to liability, in the long run
any widespread movement to adopt Helling would prove disastrous. There is a very real
possibility that the so-called "malpractice crisis" will prompt severe cut-backs in our com-
mon law system of negligence-based liability in that field. See, e.g., J. O'CoNNELL, ENDiNG
INSULT TO INJURY (1975), proposing in broad terms a no-fault insurance scheme for the
malpractice field. If to the current difficulties were added the erosion of judicial integrity
implicit in the Helling decision, the end of the negligence malpractice system would most
certainly be quick in coming.
84For the rules governing intentional intrusions, see RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 157-64 (1965). For the rules governing reckless, negligent, and accidental intrusions see
id. §§ 165 & 166. See generally V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW or TORTS § 13 at 63-75
(4th ed. 1971).
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recognized which, in the aggregate, give substantial flexibility to the
law of trespass, taken individually these privileges are quite narrowly
focused and relatively formal. 5 And even the principles of public and
private nuisance, which were developed early to provide legal remedies
in situations which did not satisfy the classic requirements of trespass,
traditionally have been subject to the same basic types of formal limita-
tions. For example, in an action based upon public nuisance, in addi-
tion to establishing an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public, a successful plaintiff almost always demonstrated
that the defendant's conduct was criminal in nature and that the harm
caused the plaintiff was different in kind from that suffered by the gen-
eral public.86 And to succeed on a theory of private nuisance, tradi-
tionally the plaintiff was required to show that he was entitled to the
private use and enjoyment of land and that the defendant's conduct had
substantially and unreasonably interfered with his rights in this regard. 7
To be sure, in deciding the "substantial and unreasonable" issue, to some
extent courts confronted problems of the open-ended, planning variety
shown earlier to be beyond their capacity to solve.88 But the context of
almost all of the classic private nuisance cases was the relatively limited
one of a dispute between adjoining landowners; and these critical terms
were traditionally defined in a way which reduced the open-endedness
of private nuisance cases to manageable levels.89
85 Se RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 167-215 (1965). The rules which come
closest to stating broad, open-ended principles are those governing public and private neces-
sity. See id. §§ 196 & 197. However, even these rules are quite narrowly circumscribed in
their wording.
86 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88 at 583-91 (4th
ed. 1971).
87 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 at 591-602 (4th ed. 1971).88 Section 826 of the original RESTATEMENT Or TORTS set forth the general rule that
an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land was un-
reasonable unless the utility of the actor's conduct outweighed the gravity of the harm;
§§ 828 & 829 set forth the factors which were to be weighed in determining the utility of
conduct and the gravity of harm. There can be little doubt that, to some extent, courts
applying these rules, faced relatively open-ended planning problems. Prosser refers to the
course of decision in these cases as a "process of judicial zoning." W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 at 600 (4th ed. 1971).
89 Thus, the original RESTATEMENT OF TORTS supplemented the basic rules described in
the preceding note with three "specific applications" which disposed of most private nuisance
cases: (1) where the defendant's conduct was malicious or indecent (§ 829); (2) where the
invasion of another's interest was substantial and could be avoided without undue hard-
ship to the defendant (§ 830); and (3) where the plaintiff's use was, and the defendant's
conduct was not, suited to the character of the locality (§ 831). This last application of
the general rules governing private nuisance is most important from our present perspec-
tive. First, it appears to have been the decisive consideration in a great many cases. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAW OF TORTS § 89 at 599-601 (4th ed. 1971); and second,
it reduced the open-endedness of this "process of judicial zoning," id. at 600, to manage-
able levels in very much the same way as does judicial reliance upon custom in medical
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Recent years have witnessed explosive reforms and developments
in the environmental protection field. Again, I am not interested here
in tracing the substantive details of these developments, nor am I par-
ticularly interested in exploring the shifts in social policies which en-
couraged and supported them. Instead, my objective is to demonstrate
that with these developments has come the tendency increasingly to in-
volve courts in reviewing the reasonableness of decisions and conduct
affecting the environment, and that this tendency poses serious threats
to the integrity of our judicial process. That courts are increasingly
being called upon to address the polycentric problem of planning a ra-
tional environment is reflected in what has happened to the traditional
formalities surrounding recovery for public and private nuisance. Thus,
whatever doubts may have existed in the past,9" it is now clearly ac-
cepted that the plaintiff in a public nuisance action is not required to
show that the defendant's conduct is criminal-in the words of the re-
cent revision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the plaintiff must
merely persuade the court of the presence of "an unreasonable interfer-
ence with a right common to the general public." 91 Moreover, to enjoin
or abate a public nuisance, one need not suffer harm of a different, or
special sort. Instead, according to a recent Restatement revision, the
plaintiff must show that he "[has] standing to sue as a representative
of the general public, or as a citizen in a citizen's action, or as a mem-
ber of a class in a class action."9 That their proponents intended these
expansions of the law of public nuisance to involve courts directly in
reviewing the reasonableness of conduct affecting the environment is
clear from the proceedings of the American Law Institute which led to
their adoption.93 Given the pressures in favor of liberalizing the prin-
ciples governing standing to sue94 and class actions,95 these reforms are
malpractice cases. See note 68 supra & text accompanying. That these private nuisance
cases were, nevertheless, most difficult is suggested by the growth in importance of zoning
ordinances in recent years. See Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuis-
ance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. RLv. 440; Comment, Real Property-The Effect of Zoning Ordi-
nnces on the Law of Nuisaice, 54 M IC. L. REV. 266 (1955).9
oFor a discussion of whether, as a technical matter, criminality was a requirement for
public nuisance at common law, see REsTATEMEXT (SECOND) or TORTS § 6 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
9 1 RESTATE3MENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 821B (1) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).9 2 RESTATEIMNT (SECOND) or TORTS § 821C (2) (c) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
93 See 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 290-305 (1970).
94 See, e.g., Eckhardt, Citizens Groups and Standing, 51 N.D.L. Rv. 359 (1974);
Rogers, The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Standings, 1 ENV. LAw. 169 (1971); Note, Ad-
ministrative Law-Standing to Sue, 40 BRoox. L. REv. 421 (1973); Comment, Standing in
Environmental Litigation: Let's Get to the Merits, 10 CAL. WEST. L. Rav. 182 (1973).
9 5 See, e.g., Comment, The Environmental Class Action After Snyder and Zahn: Ob-
taining Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Over the Class Through Application of Ancillary
Jurisdiction, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 866 (1975); Note, Environmental Class Action: Economic
Ramifications of the Rule 23 Nonaggregation Doctrine, 50 WAsH. L. REv. 143 (1974).
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almost certain to have their intended effect of involving courts increas-
ingly in environmental planning decisions.
The expansions in the rules governing private nuisance have been
even more remarkable. In fact, if recent revisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, sections on this topic96 are reflective of current
trends in our case law,97 we have already reached the point where the
outcome in a private nuisance action is directly determined by a judicial
weighing of the relative value to society of plaintiff's and defendant's
conduct. To be sure, courts were required to engage to some extent in
this sort of weighing process in actions under prior law. But all of the
traditional formality of the private nuisance concept has now been swept
away. Under the new approach the court is compelled to consider all
manner of factors in reaching a decision regarding the unreasonable-
ness of the invasion of the plaintiff's interest, including the factors of
whether the plaintiff needs to be paid 8 and whether the defendant can
afford to pay.9 The threat to the integrity of the judicial process in
attempting to render judgments under such "rules" is enormous; to
describe these developments collectively as a "retreat from the rule of
law" is to treat them too gently.
Where courts have been slow to compromise their integrity through
such expansions of traditional tort doctrines, legislatures have begun to
step in to compel this result. The recent Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act'00 is the clearest example of a statutory mandate that courts
take an active role in planning a rational environment. Quite simply, it
authorizes anyone in that state to bring anyone else into court to obtain
whatever relief may be necessary "for the protection of the air, water
and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution,
96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); §§ 822-28
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); and § 829A (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). See generally, Wade,
Environmental Protection, the Common Law of Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts,
8 THE FORUM 165 (1972).
97 The discussion of the revisions of the Restatement sections strongly suggests that,
to some extent, the American Law Institute has stated the law as it believes it should be,
rather than the law as it really is. See 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 88, 91 (1971). For a per-
suasive argument that the Institute similarly overstepped the traditional bounds of its re-
sponsibility in its recent adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A, see Hill,
Breach of Contract As A Tort, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 40 (1974).
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
9 9 See id. §§826(b) and 828(d) (Tent Draft No. 17, 1971). See generally J. HEN-
DERSON, JR. & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 749-52 (1975). Admittedly, my negative
reaction here may be somewhat influenced by the substantive policy implications of these
"ability to pay" and "need to be paid" factors. However, on purely process grounds I
insist that courts are not suited institutionally to engage in anything so open-ended as in-
come redistribution on a case by case basis.
100 MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973).
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impairment or destruction."' ' Although it is probably too soon to know
whether the courts in Michigan will succeed in holding their own against
the obvious threat to their integrity posed by this legislation, the author
and most vocal advocate of the statute has recently expressed confidence
that they will play an active role in solving the environmental problems
of that state." 2 Should the day arrive when Michigan courts are finally
badgered into implementing this statute literally, the rule of law will
have been sacrificed in the name of social politics.
I should reiterate that I am not reacting to the substantive policy
objectives reflected in the expansions of doctrine to which I have re-
ferred. We may assume, for purposes of argument, that the time has
come for our society to act decisively to prevent further degradation of
our natural environment. My point is that courts are no more capable
of helping to plan a rational environment than they are capable of help-
ing to design safe consumer products, or reasonable medical procedures.
Given sufficiently specific and formal rules of decision, they can play a
vital role in enforcing plans established elsewhere; but they cannot, with-
out seriously threatening their integrity, decide whether modes of con-
duct affecting the environment are "reasonable under all the circum-
stances." That my concerns in this regard are well founded should be
clear to anyone familiar with what is happening in the environmental
protection field. Scholarship is overwhelmingly in favor of accelerating
the trend towards judicial activism.'03 Preposterous cases are being
brought to court which, were the risks to judicial integrity not so great,
would be laughable.0 4 Occasionally, judges find themselves compelled
101 Id. at § 691.1202 (1).
1o2 See Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 Ecorooir L.Q. 1 (1974).
103 See, e.g., J. SAx, DEFENDING THE EN RONILENT (1971); Herget, The Chicago Sani-
tary and Ship Canal: A Case Study of Law as a Social Vehicle for Managing Our Environ-
ment, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 285; Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable
Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974); Peterson
& Lawrence, Challenge of Environmental Quality: An Outline of Remedies to Meet It,
1 ENvxRON. LAw 72 (1970); Pettigrew, Constitutional Right of Freedom From Ecocide,
2 EmRmoN. LAw 1 (1971); Reitze, Old King Coal and the Merry Rapists of Appalachia,
22 CASE W. Rns. L. Rnv. 650 (1971); Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment:
E=MC2 : Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CoPNELr.
L. REv. 674 (1970); Smith, The Environment and the Judiciary: A Need for Cooperation
or Reform?, 3 ENvmoN. AxrFAns 627 (1974); Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A Need
for Reform, 45 So. CA.F. L. RPv. 1025 (1972). See also notes 94-95 supra. But see
Crampton & Boyer, Citizens Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 EcoL.
L.Q. 407 (1972); Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 509 (1974).
104 See, e.g., Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972) (suit by
adjacent property owners to shut down jet traffic at Dulles Airport); Diamond v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971) (suit on behalf of 7,119,184
inhabitants of Los Angeles County against 293 of the largest corporations and municipali-
ties to restrain defendants permanently from discharging pollutants into the air).
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to respond on the merits where statutes apparently require them to do
so. Because the plaintiffs in environmental protection cases almost al-
ways seek injunctive relief, the traditional solution of leaving the deci-
sion to the jury is rarely available, and judges are left to struggle with
the problems without guidance from legal rules of decision. Examples
are beginning to appear of the breakdown of the adjudicative process
under such circumstances.10 5
If there is a source of hope for the maintenance of judicial integ-
rity in the midst of these recent developments, it resides in the en-
actment and implementation of statutes such as the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969.1"6 The Act requires that all federal agencies
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement prior to taking any major
action which may significantly affect the human environment. 0 7 From
our present process perspective, this Act provides a means by which
the mounting pressures for protecting the environment may be ac-
commodated without directly involving the courts in reviewing the
substantive merits of environmental controversies. As might be expected,
the aspects of the Act which I applaud on process grounds are con-
demned by activist writers on substantive grounds.10 8  In deciding
whether impact statements satisfy the Act's requirements, courts have
by and large refused to review extensively the merits of proposed
105 One of the dearest examples to date of a trial court losing its composure under such
strains will be found in the district court decision in United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,
380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). The action in that case was brought to enjoin the de-
fendant company's practice of dumping allegedly harmful mining wastes into Lake Superior.
After 139 days of trial, which involved over 100 witnesses, over 1,600 exhibits, and which
generated over 18,000 pages of transcript, the federal district court granted the relief sought.
Toward the end of a long opinion, the district court reveals great frustration and resent-
ment over the defendants' refusal throughout the trial to cooperate with the plaintiffs and
the court in working out a sensible solution via negotiation:
[I1n this litigation defendants steadfastly maintained that there was no feasible way
for them to put the [wastes] on land. They claimed that the costs of such a sys-
tem would be prohibitive and that furthermore such a system was technologically
infeasible. It is the Court's conclusion that this position was taken by defendants
in bad faith, that it was contrary to the facts as they knew them, and was pursued
for the sole purpose of delaying the final resolution of the controversy.
380 F. Supp. at 64. In January 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recognized that a breakdown in the adjudicative process had occurred, and took
the unusual step of removing the district judge from the case. In part, the Court of Ap-
peals explained: "[The district judge] seems to have shed the robe of the judge and to
have assumed the mantle of the advocate. The court thus becomes lawyer, witness and
judge in the same proceeding, and abandons the greatest virtue of a fair and conscientious
judge-impartiality." Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 8 E.R.C. 1511, 1515 (1976).
106 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
10742 U.S.C. § 4332(a) (c) (1970).
108See, e.g., Sax, (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. Rxv. 239 (1973);
Comment, The Role of the Courts Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH.
U.L. Rav. 300 (1973); Comment, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury... ?, 6 U. Rica. L.
Rav. 116 (1971).
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agency action;10" and once the impact statement is found to satisfy
the procedural requirements of the Act, the decision of whether
to continue with the project is left to the discretion of the agency.1 It
remains to be seen if judicial implementation of this Act will sufficiently
reduce pressures upon courts to allow them to reverse the current trend
away from principled judicial decisionmaking in the environmental pro-
tection field.
2. Where Evaluation of the Defendant's Conduct
Requires Defining the Contours of Special Relationships
Admittedly, the case law developments to be examined in this sec-
tion do not match the dramatic developments in the fields of products
liability, medical malpractice, and environmental protection with respect
to their potential economic significance to our society. However, they
are important to our present inquiry for several reasons. First, they
reveal the same basic pattern of development observed in the preceding
section: traditional limitations upon the negligence concept found to be
out of step with changing social values are attacked and finally give way,
exposing courts to the potential threat of unadjudicable problems. More-
over, the developments about to be examined reveal legal commentators
in the familiar role of encouraging the expansion and purification of the
negligence concept, most often with no concern whatever for the capacity
of courts to cope with their proposals. And finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the case law developments in this section suggest that
judges' instincts for survival run deep, and that we may yet avoid the
sacrifice of judicial integrity implicit in the expansionary trends being
examined in this article. As will be made clear in the analyses which
follow, courts (and to some extent legislatures) in many jurisdictions
appear to be implementing compromise solutions in these cases which
manage to accommodate changing social values without unduly threaten-
ing the judicial process with problems beyond its capacity to solve. Thus,
not only do the patterns of these compromises strongly support the limits
of adjudication thesis advanced here, but their accomplishment gives
hope for the long-run survival of our common law negligence system.
109 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs., 348 F. Supp. 916, 925
(N.D. Miss. 1972); City of N.Y. v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp. 868, 870 (W.D. Wash. 1971). In some decisions, such as
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972),
courts have asserted that they have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions
on the merits. However, the scope of review-i.e. whether the agency's decision is "ar-
bitrary and capricious"--insulates the courts from threatening levels of polycentricity.
11o See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs., 348 F. Supp. 916, 925
(N.D. Aiss. 1972).
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a. Intrafamily Negligence Actions
Consistent with my thesis in this article, the pattern of judicial law
reform in intrafamily negligence actions is basically similar to the pat-
terns already observed in the preceding discussions. Whatever their his-
torical origins... or the social policy explanations traditionally advanced
for their adoption," 2 the immunities from liability traditionally granted
to spouses," 3 parents," 4 and minor children" 5 served the important func-
tion of insulating courts from the difficult task of adjudicating answers
to the question, "What sort of conduct, vis-A-vis personal safety, may
close family members reasonably expect from each other?" What ren-
ders this task difficult are the special relationships between close family
members which must be taken into account in these cases. In effect, had
the immunities not been granted, courts would have been required in
many intrafamily negligence cases to design "reasonably prudent hus-
bands," or "reasonably prudent parents," in much the same way as they
would have been (and, in some states, are now being) required to design
"reasonably safe products" in product design liability cases,"" or "reason-
ably prudent medical treatment" in malpractice cases."' Admittedly, the
issues in an intrafamily dispute are not likely to be technologically difficult
or complex. But as long as it is recognized that the many special facets
of the interspousal, or parent-child, relationship must be taken into ac-
count, the negligence issue in such cases is sufficiently polycentric to frus-
trate honest attempts to submit it to adjudication.
Until fairly recently, intrafamily immunities from negligence lia-
bility have served the function just described. Exceptions to these im-
munities have long been recognized-for example, courts have tradition-
"' Historically, interspousal immunity developed from the concept that a husband and
wife were one person, and thus suit by one spouse against the other was a legal impossi-
bility. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 122, 263 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1970);
Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. 1972).
112 Suits between spouses or between parents and children have been prohibited tradi-
tionally on the grounds that such suits would cause intrafamily discord and strife. See, e.g.,
Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970); In re Estate of Pickens, 255 Ind. 119,
122, 263 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1970). Another reason given by some courts is that such suits
would encourage collusive and fraudulent suits. See, e.g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,
199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245
N.E.2d 192 (1969).
13See, e.g., Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1972); Turner v. Turner, 385
S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964).
114 See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C.
476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 432 S.W.2d 894
(1968),
15 See, e.g., Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971); 77 N.M. 139, 420
P.2d 127 (1966); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., - W.Va. - , 195 S.E.2d 810 (1973).
"
6 See pp. 488-89 supra.
117See pp. 401-93 supra.
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ally been willing to listen where intrafamily disputes concern rights in
property." 8 However, these exceptions are consistent with my thesis
due to the relative formality of the rules governing liability in such cases.
Courts can afford to respond on the merits when a child sues his parent
over rights to property because the rules governing such disputes are
among the most formal in our law. The potential threat to judicial in-
tegrity has come with the recent trend toward abrogation of the intra-
family immunities in negligence cases. Beginning in the 1960's, these
immunities in some jurisdictions appear to have suffered the same fate
as have the formal limitations upon liability for unsafe product design
described earlier, and a growing number of courts purport to have
adopted an approach to liability in these cases which will determine a
family member's negligence under all the circumstances." 9 Expansion
of the negligence concept via abrogation of intrafamily immunities has
been supported in the commentaries, 20 in at least one instance in a
manner displaying a remarkably cynical indifference to the potential
threat to the integrity of the judicial process.' 2 '
Significantly, some jurisdictions have only partially abrogated the
intrafamily immunities, in ways which support the validity of the thesis
here advanced. Thus, although courts in these jurisdictions allow intra-
family negligence actions where the occurrence giving rise to the claim
is one in which family members have interacted in a manner typical of
strangers acting at arm's length, the immunity has been retained where
the interaction of the parties to a negligence claim relates directly to
their relationship as family members (and thus would threaten the courts
with unadjudicable problems) .122 Of course, these partial abrogations
118 See, e.g., Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 428-29, 123 N.E.2d 912, 915
(1954) and cases cited therein.
119 Although these cases arose out of automobile or plane accidents, and thus did not
directly involve the intrafamily relationships, the courts speak in broad terms of total
abolition of immunities. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971);
Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Briere v. Briere,. 107 N.H. 432,
224 A.2d 588 (1966); Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
120 See, e.g., Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamiial Immunity, 7 THE FORUM 82 (1972);
Note, Interspousal Immunity-The Common Lawi Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity in
Tort Held Abrogated in Indiana, 6 IND. L. REv. 558 (1973); Note, Interspousal Immunity-
Time for a Reappraisal, 27 Omao ST. L.J. 550 (1966); Comment, Abrogation of the Parent-
Child Immunity Doctrine, 12 S.D.L. REv. 364 (1967). But see Comment, Intrajamily Im-
munity-The Doctrine and Its Present Status, 20 BAYLOR L. Riv. 27, 69-70 (1967).1 21 See Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclu-
sion Clause, 60 IowA L. Rav. 239 (1974). The author recognizes that abrogation of theimmunities may lead to a thinly disguised compensation system, but justifies the hypocrisy
on the basis of social politics. Id. at 252.
122 See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859
(1974) (parental immunity retained in childrens' actions against parents for negligent super-
vision); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971) (parental immunity retained in
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may to some extent be explained by the substantive policy considerations
traditionally advanced in support of intrafamily immunities.' 2 How-
ever, at least one court has explained its position in language which
strongly suggests that process considerations weighed in the decision."
It is difficult to predict the future course of decision in those juris-
dictions which purport to have abrogated the intrafamily immunities
completely. From our present perspective it should be noted that in
every instance discovered thus far in which courts have opted for total
abrogation, they have done so in cases which on their facts have not re-
quired a consideration and weighing of special family relationships."'
If I am right, and the weighing of that factor by courts would present
them with unmanageable problems, it seems unlikely that these courts
will actually abandon the immunities in cases which more severely test
their resolve on this issue. 2 ' If total abrogation should eventually gain
cases where alleged negligent act involves exercise of parental authority over child or exer-
cise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provision of food, clothing, housing,
etc.); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (parental immunity retained
in same cases as in Rigdon); Goler v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963)
(parental immunity retained in same cases as in Rigdon). See also Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d
200 (1971); in which the courts appear to have limited the abrogations to cases which
did not involve the special family relationships.
123 That is, one might conclude that the immunities are being retained in cases involv-
ing the special family relationships in order to foster the free and uninhibited exercise of
intrafamily responsibilities.
124 In Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974),
the court discussed traditional reasons for retaining parental immunity in negligent super-
vision actions (family discord, depletion of family resources) and then went on to discuss
the unadjudicability of a parent's duty to supervise. "An additional factor to be placed
on the policy scale is the difficulty of judicial delimitation, either by court or by jury, of
the bounds of the asserted right to supervision. The possibilities are virtually limitless ....
Id. at 49, 324 N.E.2d at 345-46, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
125See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) (car crash; parental immunity
abrogated); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970) (car accident; parental
immunity abrogated); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972) (car acci-
dent; interspousal immunity abrogated); Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66
(1966) (car crash; child immunity from parental suit abolished); Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966) (car accident; parental immunity abolished); Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (car accident; interspousal immunity abrogated);
Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975) (airplane crash; interspousal im-
munity abolished); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529 (1969) (car accident; child immunity from parental suit abrogated); Falco v. Pados,
444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (car accident; parental immunity abolished); Surratt v.
Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (car accident; interspousal immunity
abrogated).
12 6 THE RESTArEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs in §§ 895G and 895H (Tent. Draft No. 18,
1972), has adopted total abrogation of intrafamily immunities. Comment j. to § 895H rec-
ognizes the legitimacy of the position described herein as "partial abrogation," but prefers
to speak of completely abolishing the immunities and then leaving the elements of special
family relationships to be weighed on a case by case basis in determining whether a breach
of duty has occurred. Conceptual logic aside, the Restatement position completely over-
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the day, and courts generally should begin addressing questions such as
"How would a reasonable mother behave towards her child under similar
circumstances?", then case by case implementation of the negligence
concept in intrafamily torts disputes will begin to encounter serious diffi-
culties. Focussing upon a presumed lack of contentiousness between the
parties to such actions, several observers have already detected an erosion
of integrity in intrafamily negligence cases that do not involve special
family relationships. 127 If to these difficulties were added the unmanage-
able task of designing family relationships in court, all pretense of prin-
cipled decisionmaking would surely vanish. In that event, it would not
take long for the negligence lottery in such cases to be replaced, almost
certainly legislatively, by some more honest and efficient system of com-
pensating the victims of intrafamily accidents. 28
b. Negligence Actions Against Governmental Agencies
The history of the origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine and
its gradual abrogation in recent years has been thoroughly chronicled
elsewhere and need not be repeated.'29 From our present perspective,
the pattern should by now be familiar. Although justified traditionally
on the basis of logic 30 and practical politics," 1 the immunity from tort
liability granted to agencies of government nevertheless served the neces-
sary function of insulating courts from the hopelessly polycentric task
of helping to manage the relationships between the sovereign and its
looks the process implications of treating these issues under the heading of breach rather
than immunity. I can only hope that courts have the good sense to resist the influence
of the Restatement on this point.
127See, e.g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (Francis, J., dissenting). See
Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause,
60 IowA L. REV. 239, 253 (1974).1 28 The author of the article in the preceding footnote advocates just such a no-fault
compensation system.
129 The historical origins of governmental immunity are traced and the early cases
analyzed in a series of articles by Borchard entitled Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YAxz
L.J. 1, 129, 221 (1924); and Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Ynn L.J. 1, 757,
1039 (1926), 28 CoLDm. L. Rav. 577, 734 (1928). See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REy. 1, 209 (1963). A state by state break-
down of the effects of recent reforms and the status of governmental immunity at the state
and local levels appears in a note to §§ 895B and 895C of the R,'TATEMENT (Sa.ONw) OF
TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
180 See, e.g., Justice Holmes' famous dictum in Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S.
349, 353 (1970): "A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends." For a criticism of Holmes' statement see Jaffe, supra note 129, at 4-5.
13 1 Prosser suggests two such reasons: (1) a reluctance to divert public funds to com-
pensate for private injuries; and (2) the inconvenience and embarrassment which would be
caused by tort actions against agencies of government. See W. PRossER, HANDBoox OF TE
LAw OF ToRTs § 131 at 975 n.51 (4th ed. 1971).
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subjects. If judicial integrity would be threatened by the question, "How
should a reasonable parent behave toward his children?" '132 it would
surely be overwhelmed were courts to attempt to adjudicate answers to
the question, "How should a reasonable government behave toward its
citizens ?" However, given the mounting social pressures favoring com-
pensation for accident victims, and consistent with the trend toward ex-
pansion and purification of the negligence concept, courts have begun
abrogating the sovereign immunity doctrine in recent years.l" Gradu-
ally this tendency has accelerated, accompanied by judicial expressions
of frustration over the difficulties of developing a sensible, workable
system of governmental liability on a case-by-case basis.
134
To this point, of course, the foregoing narrative bears a striking
resemblance to descriptions offered above of recent developments in other
areas of negligence law: a time-honored, formal limitation upon the
basic negligence concept outlives its social usefulness and is finally aban-
doned, exposing courts to open-ended planning problems beyond their
capacity to solve. However, in this instance the story has a different,
happier, ending. Instead of the negligence-based liability of govern-
mental agencies expanding to the point that judicial integrity would be
threatened and destroyed, compromise solutions have been worked out
which strike a balance between the desirability of governmental accounta-
bility in tort for the negligent behavior of its agencies and the necessity
that courts refrain from addressing problems which are beyond their
inherent capacities to solve.
The substantive content of the compromises between the need for,
and the inherent limits upon, judicial review of the decisions and con-
duct of governmental agencies could not be more consistent with the
thesis herein advanced. Although jurisdictions vary in their manner of
expression,"8" the basic principles determining whether or not govern-
132 See text accompanying notes 35 & 114-20 supra.
183 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971);
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959);
Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Willis v. Dept. of
Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
154 See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972):
Exactly what constitutes a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental func-
tion has never been clearly enunciated by the courts, and this failure to establish
a criteria has led to the generally confused state of the bench and bar in the appli-
cation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Deciding on useful guidelines be-
tween rather obscure, whimsical notions enunciated by the appellate courts through-
out the country has caused enormous conflicts in the courts in the past decade ....
Id. at 59, 284 N.E.2d at 735.
185 The Federal Torts Claims Act precludes liability of the United States government
for claims based on the "exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). Section 895B of the
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ment is immune from tort liability are these: where the conduct labelled
negligent by the plaintiff is such that a decision with respect to its reason-
ableness does not necessitate defining the contours of the special rela-
tionship between the government and its citizens, there is no immunity
from liability ;136 but in cases where the court would be required to define
the contours of that relationship, the traditional rule of sovereign im-
munity is retained. 3 The striking similarity between this approach and
that being taken in some jurisdictions in abrogating traditional intra-
family immunities' is not accidental-both approaches define the extent
of the defendant's liability in a way that provides the maximum protec-
tion to injured plaintiffs consistent with the requirement that the courts
refrain from responding to the sorts of polycentric issues of social plan-
ning that would compromise their integrity. Although discussions of
sovereign immunity have tended to focus on the substantive policy ob-
jectives of the doctrine, these judicial process considerations have been
recognized by a number of writers. 3 9
The importance of these reforms of governmental tort liability in
the present context goes substantially beyond the support their content
implicitly gives to my thesis concerning the limits of adjudication. Of
no less significance than their substance has been their manner of ac-
complishment. To an extent unique among the areas of reform and
development considered in this article, the modifications of the sovereign
immunity doctrine in recent years has been the product of legislative,
rather than judicial, action. 4 Several different patterns of interaction
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS extends immunity to the states for "acts and omissions
constituting... the exercise of an administrative function involving a basic policy decision."
(§ 895B (3) (b), Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). The Supreme Court of Washington extended
the immunity to "the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise." Evan-
gelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440,
445 (1965).
136See, e.g., Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971)
(steps at county courthouse fell into disrepair, causing injuries); Molitor v. Kaneland Com-
munity Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 1, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (negligence of school bus
dri'zer caused accident).
137 See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897 (1968) (failure to provide police protection); Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d
409, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960) (discretionary decisions by traffic planning officials regarding
traffic control system at intersection). See generally Herzog, Liability of the State of New
York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 SYRAcusE L. REV. 30 (1958). For statutory
rules see authorities cited note 142 infra.
13 8 See note 122 supra & text accompanying.
139 That is, a number of writers have questioned the ability of courts to develop work-
able compromises on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209, 235-39 (1963); Van Alstyne, Govern
mental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 463, 465 (1963);
Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 Dun L.J.
888, 893-94.
140 The tort liability of the United States government is now controlled by the Federal
Torts Claims Act, 60 Stat. 812 (1956). The provisions of the act appear in various sections
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between courts and legislatures emerge from a review of the develop-
ments over the last 30 years. In many instances, legislatures have acted
ahead of courts in abrogating the traditional rule of immunity and re-
placing it with some form of compromise conforming to the basic prin-
ciple outlined above.'41 On the other hand, in many jurisdictions legis-
lation has followed, and been prompted by, judicial abrogation of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.'42 Most often, these statutes have con-
formed to the basic outlines of compromise described earlier.'43 In some
states, legislation has instead focused on the relatively superficial (from
the present process perspective) aspect of protecting the public fisc, either
by placing limits upon recovery 4  or by waiving the immunity only
where liability insurance is available as a fund from which to pay the
plaintiff. 45
It would be unfair to conclude that courts have played no role in
working out the details of these compromises-in some states, courts
have built upon early legislative efforts and have developed sensible com-
promise positions which accommodate both the rights of injured plain-
tiffs and a recognition of the limits of adjudication. 4 But it is accurate
to describe the recent reforms in the area of governmental liability as
having a distinctly legislative, as opposed to judicial, flavor. The sig-
nificance of this fact lies in its implications for long-range solutions to
similar problems beginning to appear in other areas of negligence law,
of the United States Code. For a compilation of these sections see 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLIG
FEDERAL TORTS CLAris, Appendix 1 (1974). See also James, The Federal Torts Claims Act
and the "Discretionary Function" Exception, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184 (1957); Reynolds,
The Discretionary Function Exeception of the Federal Torts Claims Act, 57 Gzo. L.J. 81
(1968). For a comprehensive, state-by-state compilation of the statutes governing state and
local immunities from tort liability see the note accompanying §§ 895B and 895C of the
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORT (Tent. Draft. No. 19, 1973). For a useful description
of the cooperative efforts of legislatures and courts in a number of states see Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919.
14 1 This was basically the pattern followed in the adoption of the Federal Torts Claims
Act. See also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 4-141 et seq. (1966); HAwA Ray. STAT.
§§ 662-1 et seq. (1968); MASs. ANN. LAWS, ch. 12, §§ 3A-3D (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.996 (113) (1969); N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (1963).
142 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 810 et seq. (West 1966); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-10-101 et seq. (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1966);
MrNN. STAT. ANN §§ 466.01 et seq. (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
143 That is, they have tended to create a number of relatively specific instances where
the immunity from liability is retained as a barrier to the courts' considering the special
relationship between government and its citizens. See notes 140-42 supra.
144 For a critical discussion of this approach, see Van Aistyne, Governmental Tort Lia-
bility: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 970-72.
145 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 69-301 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4715, 74-4716
(Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 83-701 et seq. (1968).
146 Perhaps the best example of this sort of development is to be found in New York.
The legislature unconditionally abolished the immunity (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (1963)), and
the courts have worked out a remarkable system of compromise solutions extending im-
munity to certain governmental activities. See note 137 supra.
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some of which have been explored in this article: if the courts are not
capable of developing workable sets of rules with 'which to keep the prob-
lems before them within proper bounds, 1 7 then legislatures may be
forced to step in and impose the necessary formalities by statute. Of
course, undoubtedly there are special reasons why legislatures have
tended to move quickly in the area of governmental liability. Probably
the most important factor is the practical reality that the politicians
who constitute such deliberative bodies are especially sensitive to the
budgetary implications of total judicial abrogation of governmental im-
munity. Moreover, there is a basic, almost constitutional, dimension to
the problem presented by independent judicial review of policy decisions
of government. 4
And yet, I submit that in the long run the limits of adjudica-
tion principle which I have advanced in this article will force the
same pattern of legislative response in some of the other areas in
which the negligence concept has undergone expansion and purification
in recent years. Thus, it is only a matter of time before scholars, judges,
and legislators come to realize that the same legal process difficulties
posed by ad hoc judicial review of governmental policy planning deci-
sions are presented whenever courts attempt to review such planning
decisions, whether they are decisions reached by design engineers, doc-
tors, businssmen, or parents. To be sure, the practical politics of these
various situations are different. Presumably, agencies of government
can be ti-usted in a way that businessmen cannot (and parents and doc-
tors fall somewhere in the middle). But from the present process per-
spective the problems posed by all of these situations are basically the
same. Because the abrogation of sovereign immunity dramatically threat-
ens the economic viability of the agencies of government toward which
it is directed, the process problems it poses have, thus far, received the
greatest attention. But if I am correct regarding the confusion and chaos
which lies ahead if courts continue to expand the scope of ad hoc, negli-
gence-based review in other areas, it is only a matter of time before
these other areas catch up. When they do, and chaos finally descends
upon us, the recent patterns of reform in the governmental liability-
147Cf. notes 134 and 139 supra. But cf. note 146 supra.
148Thus, even the most persistent advocate for reform in this area has admitted the
necessity of such limits, albeit on essentially substantive grounds: "Obviously the Admin-
istration cannot be held to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or
defects, for life in an organized community requires a certain number of sacrifices and even
risks." Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924). For treatments
of the constitutional dimensions of sovereign immunity, see generally Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv.. 1 (1972); Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. Ray. 1, 19-
29 (1963).
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immunity area strongly suggest that legislatures will play an active role
in setting things right.149
c. Negligence Actions Against Possessors of Land
The principal utility of this topic in the present context resides not
so much in its practical importance as in the clarity with which it dem-
onstrates the current trend toward expansion of the negligence concept.
No clearer example can be found of the tendency in recent years for
courts to abandon traditional formalities in favor of the core principle
of reasonable care under the circumstances of each case, nor is it pos-
sible to imagine an area in which legal commentators have been more
enthusiastically and unanimously in support of such developments. In
fact, if one were to focus solely upon the theoretical aspects of the sub-
ject, the recent expansion of negligence-based liability of possessors of
land probably deserves to be recognized as a paradigm of the sort of
development I have been examining in this article. 5
At common law, the duty owned by a possessor of land to one
coming on the land depended upon the relationship between the possessor
and entrant. Those who entered with the possessor's permission and in
furtherance of a business purpose of the possessor were deemed invitees,
to whom the possessor owed the duty of reasonable care to see that the
premises were reasonably safe and did not expose the entrant to undue
risks of harm. 5 ' Those who entered with the possessor's permission but
not in furtherance of the latter's business purpose were deemed licensees
and were owed a lesser, though not insubstantial, duty of care.1 2 And
those who entered without permission were deemed trespassers, to whom
very little in the way of legal duties were owed.'53 Over time, as the
social policies supporting the ownership and use of private land gave
way to policies favoring greater protection of entrants from risks of
149 Professor Peck has advanced the thesis that one of the basic functions of judicial
law reform in torts is to provoke necessary legislative enactments in response. See Peck,
The Role of the Courts and Legislatures ins the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MANN. L. REV.
265 (1963).
15OAn activist writer has recently concluded: "Rowland [a recent California decision
expanding the negligence concept in this area-see notes 160 et seq. infra] is not an iso-
lated instance of judicial reform of the common law; rather it is part of a policy oriented
judicial activism which is remaking the entire body of tort law and abrogating traditional
limitations on recovery." Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step
Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 820, 823 (1975).
151 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 332, 341A, 343-44 (1965); W. PROSSEm,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 61 at 385-98 (4th ed. 1971).
15 2See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 330, 341-42 (1965): W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60 at 376-85 (4th ed. 1971).
153See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 333-39 (1965); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 58-59 at 357-76 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 51:467
DEVELOPMENTS IN TORTS
harm believed to be avoidable at relatively low cost, formal exceptions
to the harsher aspects of the rules governing liability to trespassers were
recognized and developed. 5 This process of recognizing exceptions and
drawing distinctions continued into the present century, until a complex
and relatively formal body of negligence doctrine governed the rights
and duties of those in the special relationships of possessors of, and
entrants on, land. 55
Scholarly treatments of the social policies underlying this body of
doctrine have traditionally emphasized the importance attached to the
ownership and possession of land at common law and the necessity of
limiting possessors' liability in the interests of promoting efficient and
therefore socially beneficial patterns of land use.1"" From our present
perspective, of course, this same body of doctrine also served the equally
important function of screening courts from the potentially unmanage-
able open-endedness of the basic, underlying question implicitly involved
in all such cases: "What, in the way of minimum safety precautions to
those coming on the premises, can society require from persons in the
peculiarly important position of owning, occupying, and using land?"
As long as society continued to view the relationship between land
possessor and entrant as deserving of special consideration, the formal
rules governing possessors' liability were a necessary prerequisite to
the adjudicability of negligence cases involving the plaintiff's entry
on land. 57
Two forces combined to threaten the survival of the common law
system of possessors' liability: first, the mounting social pressures favor-
ing compensation of accident victims as an end in itself ;158 and second,
the growing tendency in modern legal thought to view formality of any
154E.g., the exceptions favoring constant trespassers on a limited area (RESTATENMNT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS* §§ 334-35 (1965)), known trespassers, id. at §§ 336-38, and trespassing
children, id. at § 339.
155 Prosser seems to be ambivalent in his attitude towards these doctrines. On the one
hand, he refers to them as "Etihe system of rigid categories . . . into one of which the
plaintiff must be forced to fit . .." W. PRossR, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAW OF TORTS § 62
at 398 (4th ed. 1971). And on the other, he refers to "the rules as to trespassing children
which were worked out over so many years with so much blood, sweat, toil and tears .... "
Id. at 399 n.4.
:
0 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HAI DBOOK OF TiE LAW oF TORTS § 58 at 357-59 (4th ed.
1971); Goodrich, Landowner's Duty to Strangers on His Premises-As Developed in the
Iowa Decions, 7 IowA L. B=u_. 65 (1922).
157 In this respect, the rules governing possessors' liability bear a striking resemblance
to the exceptions to the privity rule worked out in products cases during the period pre-
ceding MacPherson v. Buick Co. See notes 41-45 supra & text accompanying. See also note
203 infra & text accompanying.
'
5 8 See note 37 supra & text accompanying. Not surprisingly, Professor James has been
an outspoken critic of the formal rules limiting possessors' liability. See 2 F. HARER &
F. JAMES, LAw or TORTS 1430-1505 (1956).
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kind as an unnecessary impediment to achieving justice in every case.' "
Thus, it was probably inevitable that so forward-thinking a tribunal as
the Supreme Court of California would eventually conclude, as it did in
its well known decision in Rowland v. Christian,'"6 that such a body of
formal negligence doctrine constituted a "semantic morass . . .contrary
to our modern social mores and humanitarian values,"' 61 and would dis-
card it in favor of determining liability on the more aesthetically pleas-
ing basis of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under all of
the circumstances.' 62 Given the enthusiastic support which this decision
has received from the commentators, 6 ' it is hardly surprising that other
jurisdictions have followed California's lead.""
In properly assessing these recent developments from a process per-
spective, it is necessary to examine them more closely. It will be recalled
from the outset that the process difficulties of concern in this section
stem from the necessity for the courts to define the contours of special
relationships in deciding the negligence issue.'65 Certainly there would
be little basis for objection on process grounds if the California court
in Rowland had concluded that the "modern social mores and humani-
tarian values" to which it refers have progressed to the point that the
relationships between possessors and entrants are no longer special-i.e.,
are no different from the relationships which generally obtain between
strangers in our society acting at arm's length. Had the court in Row-
land gone all the way to denying completely the relevance of the posses-
sor-entrant relationship, there is no reason to think that the traditional
159 See notes 39-40 supra & text accompanying.
160 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 961, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
161 Id. at 116, 118, 443 P.2d at 566, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102, 104.
162
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land... is whether
in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the
probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have
some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.
Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
163 See, e.g., Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond
Rowland and Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 820 (1975); Comment, Torts-Occupies Lia-
bility Entrants-"Invitee," "Licensee," and "Trespasser" Distinction Abolished, 23 ARE. L.
Rav. 153 (1969); Comment, Torts-Negligence-Premises Liability: The Foreseeable Emer-
gence of the Community Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145 (1974); Comment, Occupier of Land
Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All Entrants, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426 (1969); Note,
A Re-examination of the Land Possessor's Duty to Trespassers, Licensees and Invitees, 14
S.D.L. REV. 332 (1969).
164 See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mario-
renzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., - R.I. - , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii
1969).
165 See pp. 479-81 supra.
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combination of the reasonable man test and the lay jury verdict would
not have sufficed to obscure the analytical difficulties in such cases.166
But that is not what the California court concluded. Quite to the
contrary, the majority in Rowland asserted that the status of the plain-
tiff, and hence the relationship between possessor and entrant, will re-
main an important consideration in these cases.' 67 What the Rowland
court actually opposed was not giving weight to the plaintiff's status,
but giving that factor controlling or conclusive weight by means of for-
mal rules of decision."" Thus, the holding in that case is not so much
an attack on the politics supporting the traditional rules of possessor's
liability as it is an attack on the formalities which rendered those rules
adjudicable. Under Rowland, the triers of fact presumably will be ex-
pected, as before, to take the relationship between possessor and entrant
into account, but now without any formal guidance from the law. Thus,
they will be expected to give meaning and effect to that relationship on
a case by case basis, guided only by common sense and intuition. Pur-
porting as it does to retain the substance of the prior law, while aban-
doning its form, the decision epitomizes what I have characterized as
the retreat from the rule of law.
Given the potential difficulties of implementing the Rowland ap-
proach, it is not surprising that a number of courts have refused to follow
the California lead. Several jurisdictions have rejected Rowland out-
right.' 69 Others have determined to withhold final decision on whether
or not to abandon traditional doctrines until further experience under
the new approach is gained in other jurisdictions.7 And reflecting the
166 See notes 29-31 supra & text accompanying.
167
Once the ancient concepts as to the liability of the occupier of land are stripped
away, the status of the plaintiff relegated to its proper place in determining such
liability, and ordinary principles of negligence applied, the result in the instant case
presents no substantial difficulties. (Emphasis added.)
69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
1681 rely upon two factors in reaching this conclusion. The first is the language of the
opinion itself. See notes 162 and 167 supra. The second factor is a deeply ingrained hunch
that the court really does not intend to abandon the centuries-old bias against trespassers
coming onto the land, and that in an appropriate case the court will permit the jury to
weigh the plaintiff's trespasser status as a limiting factor apart from its effect upon fore-
seeability. Obviously the dissenters in Rowland share my suspicion. See 69 Cal. 2d at
120-21, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105. And the retention of the traditional doctrines
limiting possessors' liability to trespassers by courts willing otherwise to accept Rowland
as to licensees and invitees (see note 169 infra) suggests I may be right. If I am, and if
the California court is not actually ready to treat trespasser cases on the basis of foresee-
ability, then one can expect that the special status of trespassers will be reintroduced, per-
haps gradually, into the rules governing possessors' liability in that state.
169 E.g., Robles v. Severyn, 19 Ariz. App. 61, 504 P.2d 1284 (1973); Astleford v. Milner
Enterprises, Inc., 233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970).
170 E.g., Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1972); DiGildo V. Caponi,
18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969).
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reality that the cases which will pose the greatest process difficulties will
be those involving plaintiff trespassers, 171 several courts have adopted the
Rowland decision as it applies to licensees and invites but have retained
the traditional doctrines limiting possessors' liability to trespassers.' 2
Bearing in mind the extent to which commentators have praised Row-
land's humanitarian stance, 17 these decisions suggest that judges often
have more common sense than the people who write about them.
3. Where Practical Limits Must Be Placed
Upon the Extent of Potential Liability
The difficulties in the cases in this section reflect the reality that
the torts process cannot, as a practical matter, offer a remedy to every-
one who claims to have been harmed by antisocial conduct." Tradi-
tionally, tort law has been content to address what may be characterized
as the wide mid-range of social problems-where controversies are either
too trivial or too consequential, the torts process has refused, based upon
social policy considerations, to let itself become involved. Thus, tort
remedies are rarely afforded in situations in which the harm typically
suffered by the plaintiff is considered too small to justify the transac-
tional costs of addressing the problem legally ;175 and in situations where
171 Trespasser cases will be the most difficult because the courts will feel the greatest
pressures to take the plaintiff's special status into account. I strongly suspect that courts
will encounter little difficulties in abandoning the licensee-invitee distinction. That is, courts
are probably ready and willing to treat licensees and invitees alike with respect to their
arm's length relationships with possessors of land, and to retreat from rules which placed
licensees at a legal disadvantage. However, I equally strongly suspect that courts are not
ready to concede that the duties owed to trespassers are to be determined by the same
principles of foreseeability that determine the duties of care owed generally by persons
dealing with one another at arm's length in our society. Thus, courts which purport to
have abandoned traditional doctrines governing liability to trespassers will be forced to
define the contours of the possessor-trespasser relationship on a case-by-case basis.
172 E.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Mousey v. Ellard, 73 Mass. A.S.
871, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 U.W.2d 639 (1972).
173 See note 163 supra.
174 See generally C. MoRRIs, MoRRis ON TORTS 8-10 (1953); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
or THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1 & 2 at 6-7 (4th ed. 1971).175 Two basic approaches have been employed in achieving this objective. For uninten-
tional wrongs, which historically grew out of the development of trespass on the case, actual
loss or damage must be proven. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK oF =n LAw OF TORTS
§ 30 at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971). And for intentional wrongs, where harm is presumed, the
rules governing liability have traditionally been quite formal, requiring in every instance
something more than merely the defendant's intent to harm the plaintiff. For example, for
an offensive battery to be committed, the defendant must contact the plaintiff's person (see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 13 (1965)). To be sure, the recognition in recent years
of the right to recover for intentionally inflicted emotional upset (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965)) to some extent introduces into the rules governing intentional torts
the same sort of open-endedness that we are here examining in the negligence context. How-
ever, the rule establishing this new generic tort attempts to replace qualitative formality
(e.g., the requirement of contact in battery, supra) with "quantitative formality" (i.e., the
defendant's conduct must be "outrageous" and the plaintiff's distress "severe"). The ques-
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the potential liability of the defendant is so enormous that its imposition
would generate dislocation costs greater than those already suffered by
the plaintiff, the tort system has similarly refused to allow recovery.7 8
There are two basically different perspectives from which to view
this aspect of the tort system. From the social policy perspective, the
important problem is one of assigning relative values to the various in-
terests at stake, and deciding when to view as "trivial" or "enormous"
the harmful consequences of defendants' behavior. From the process
perspective, the problem is one of defining the limitations upon liability
with sufficient formality to allow the courts to implement them in a prin-
cipled fashion. It should be understood that from the process perspec-
tive the system could function perfectly well if no limits upon potential
tort liability were fixed-the necessity to set limits comes from social
policy, rather than process, considerations. But once the decision is made
to set limits, process considerations dictate that the limits be set with
sufficient formality to support adjudication. Once again, it is the process,
rather than the social policy, perspective which I shall emphasize here.
In the sections which follow I shall examine two recent examples of
courts abandoning traditional, formal limitations upon liability in negli-
gence, and I shall attempt to demonstrate the potential threat to the
integrity of the judicial process posed by these developments.
a. Actions for Negligently Caused Fright Without Impact
The process function served by the traditional rule in personal in-
jury actions requiring that the defendant's negligent conduct cause a
physical impact upon the plaintiff's person 177 should be clear. Although
writers have tended to focus on the possibility of fraudulent claims,
178
the more substantive problem is one of avoiding potentially limitless lia-
bility.1 7 9 From the beginning courts have recognized the practical neces-
sity in some situations of limiting liability for negligent conduct by more
tion of whether these quantitative limits will work to render the new tort manageable is
beyond the scope of this article.
170See notes 181-84 and 199 infra.
177The leading case is Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
For a recent case reaffirming the physical impact requirement in negligence cases see Gilliam
v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
17 8See, e.g., W. PROSSR, HNDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF TORTS § 54 at 328 nn.38-39 (4th
ed. 1971): "It is now more or less generally conceded that the only valid objection against
recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims."
179 The opinion of the Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), discredits the fraudulent claim argument but recognizes that prac-
tical limits upon liability will be necessary. See notes 187-89 infra. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, which has followed Dillon enthusiastically (see note 192 infra), recently
held as a matter of law that a plaintiff's upset, though clearly genuine, was too remote to
have been foreseen by the defendant. See note 195 infra.
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than "reasonable foreseeability." The problem tends to arise only rarely
in cases involving harm caused by tangible invasions of the plaintiff's
person or property due to built in, de facto limitations on the capability
of most actors physically to alter their environment. Therefore, in most
negligence cases involving direct physical impact on the plaintiff, the
open-endedness of the proximate cause concept as a limitation upon lia-
bility has proven to be both adequate from the practical viewpoint and
relatively harmless from the process viewpoint. 80 And in the rare in-
stances where de facto limitations have not kept defendant's exposure to
liability for physical harm to others within sensible bounds, courts181
and legislatures8 2 have stepped in with formal limits on liability.
However, the situation with respect to negligently caused mental
and emotional upset without impact is different. In these cases, rela-
tively mundane accidents have the potential of affecting multitudes of
plaintiffs. Therefore, in cases involving mental upset without impact,
courts have traditionally refused to leave the question of the extent of
defendant's liability to be decided on so open-ended a basis as the "rea-
sonable foreseeability" test of proximate cause. Instead, they have turned
to the conceptual source of liability in negligence-the duty of care owed
180 Thus, although at first glance the proximate cause concept appears to violate the
principle that limits on liability must be formal, in actuality it is harmless in most instances.
The relative harmlessness of the proximate cause concept stems from the fact that in most
cases involving direct physical impact, the judge in responding to a motion for a directed
verdict can apply the foreseeability test in a "let the chips fall where they may" fashion-
i.e., the judge can apply it in a more or less mechanical fashion in light of what are per-
ceived to be the relevant probabilities that harm of a particular sort would be caused by
defendant's conduct. And once the issue gets to the jury, it probably ceases to be an
issue-i.e., once the jury struggles to a conclusion regarding the central issues of fault and
cause-in-fact, they are unlikely to be influenced by so esoteric and legalistic a notion as
"proximate cause." Of course, to the extent that litigants, judges, and juries occasionally
actually take the proximate cause concept seriously, it unquestionably presents significant
difficulties. "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth
more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor,
despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any
general agreement as to the proper approach." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41 at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
18 1 A classic example of a formal, court-made rule limiting the defendant's liability well
within the bounds of foreseeability appears in Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y.
210 (1866), in which the defendant's liability in negligence for harm caused by fire was
limited, as a matter of law, to the first adjoining building. See also note 177 supra and
notes 184 and 199 infra.
182 Perhaps the most striking example of a situation in which the traditional de facto
limitations have proven insufficient involves the potentially catastrophic harm which might
be caused by the breakdown of a large nuclear power facility. Consistent with the present
analysis, Congress has provided practical limits on potential liability via the Price-Anderson
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1964). The
limit on liability was set at $500 million in 1970, with an agreement to indemnify out of
federal funds, up to those limits, the victims of such a catastrophe. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(c)
(Supp. V, 1970). See generally England, Nuclear Insurance and the Price-Anderson Act, 13
ATOMIc ENERGY L.J. 27 (1971); Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote
Causes: The Low-Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. Rav. 531 (1971).
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to others in society-and have defined it in a way which places severe
and formal limits upon recovery for negligently caused fright (or other
mental upset) without impact. The first such rule to emerge required
impact upon the plaintiff's person as a prerequisite to recovery in negli-
gence.'x In time, a number of jurisdictions replaced the so-called "im-
pact rule" with a more liberal, but nevertheless relatively formal, rule
that allowed plaintiffs within the zone of physical danger from defen-
dants' conduct to recover for upset caused by fear for their own safety.'
Again, it will be observed that both the impact and the zone-of-danger
rules serve two basic functions: first, the social policy function of plac-
ing practical limits on negligence-based liability which have at least some
relation to the probable merits of individual cases; and second, the
process function of accomplishing these limitations in a sufficiently for-
mal manner to render the negligence concept adjudicable in the wide
range of cases in which plaintiffs seek to recover for mental and emo-
tional upset.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of California in Dillon v. Legg,"'5
in which the traditional impact and zone-of-danger rules were discarded
in favor of determining the worthiness of plaintiffs' claims on a case by
case basis, deserves to be enshrined as one of the great examples in our
law of a court abandoning decision-by-rule in the name of social justice.
My criticism of this decision is not directed at the accuracy of the court's
recitation of the shifts in social attitudes towards compensating accident
victims (the opinion refers to "the natural justice upon which the
[plaintiff's] claim rests"),"'6 nor is it directed at the result reached on
the facts (the plaintiff was a mother who, although outside the zone of
danger, allegedly suffered emotional trauma and resulting physical injury
from witnessing the negligently caused death of her minor child.) In
fact, I am ready to accept as a premise that shifts in social values now
require some more liberal rule fixing limits on liability in so-called "fright
without impact" cases. However, I insist that whatever the content of
such a rule, it must be stated in relatively formal terms, and therefore
I must reject the court's conclusion to the contrary on this important
process issue.
Although the opinion at one point seems to suggest that formal
limitations will be required to be established in future cases,1 7 read as
183 See note 177 supra.
184 The leading case is Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). See
also Falzone v. Busch, 45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
185 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal Rptr. 72 (1968).
188 Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
187 Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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a whole it is clear that the California court in Dillon is opting for a case
by case, under-all-the-circumstances resolution in these cases:
Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes
a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk,
that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it is in-
herently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obligation must
necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis. We cannot
now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed
category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obliga-
tion for every circumstance of the future. We can, however, define
guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the in-
stant one.188
The opinion offers a cluster of three factors which, among others, pre-
sumably will permit courts in the future to achieve "natural justice"
in every case. 8" That the majority in Dillon embraces the naive belief
that adjudication can solve even the most open-ended problems, and
therefore that a "cluster of factors" approach will prove adequate as a
basis upon which to adjudicate future cases, is clear from these confident
assertions towards the end of the opinion: "The test that we have set
forth will aid in the proper resolution of future cases. Indeed, the gen-
eral principles of tort law are acknowledged to work successfully in all
other cases of emotional trauma. . . . If we stop at this point .. .we
must necessarily question and reject . . . the viability of the judicial
process for ascertaining liability for tortious conduct itself." 90
That my concerns over the possible adverse impact of Dillon upon
the integrity of the torts process are not altogether unfounded is borne
out to some extent by what has happened since that decision. Torts
writers, as I have come to expect, have been almost unanimous in their
praise of both the result and its suggested methodology.' 91 Courts in
several other jurisdictions have followed the decision, and have extended
it to different, and from a process perspective, more troublesome, fact
patterns. 2 To the three factors deemed relevant in the Dillon opinion
188 Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 747-48, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
191 See, e.g., Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by An-
other's Peril, 48 TuL. L. REV. 782 (1974); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Dis-
tress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States, 25 HAsT. L.J. 1248 (1974);
Note, Tort Law-Emotional Disturbances and Resulting Physical Injuries Occasioned by
Negligence, 8 U. Rica. L. REV. 366 (1974); Note, Torts-Recovery for Physically Mani-
fested Mental Disturbance-Towards a More Liberal Negligence Approach, 10 WAxE FOR.
L. REv. 187 (1974); Note, Torts-Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and
Emotional Injury, 76 W. VA. L. Rv. 176 (1974).192 See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973) (plaintiff, out
of zone of danger, witnessed mail truck run over four year old son); Rodrigues v. State,
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have been added others, increasing exponentially the open-endedness of
the "under all the circumstances" approach.193
And yet, I must concede that there are indications that my worst
fears will not materialize. For one thing, a number of jurisdictions
which have considered Dillon have rejected it as unworkable. 194 More-
over, even where the Dillon holding has been followed, there are indi-
cations that a more formal and manageable, albeit more liberal, limita-
tion on liability in these cases will eventually be worked out.195 Thus,
the recent trend towards liberalization of the traditional rules govern-
ing recovery for negligently caused fright without impact reveals the
familiar pattern of courts flirting with disaster without actually con-
fronting it. Clearly, these cases reflect the current tendency of courts
to abandon formal limitations upon negligence-based liability together
with the tendency of torts writers to push courts in this direction. How-
ever, the decisions thus far reveal that courts may not go so far as to
expose themselves to the risks which would inhere in any wholesale
commitment to doing justice on the facts of each particular case.
52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (husband and wife suffered upset from unwitnessed
flood damage to house); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (ten
year old, out of zone of danger, witnessed death of stepgrandmother) ; Toms v. McConnell,
45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (mother, out of zone of danger, witnessed
daughter killed by truck).
1931k D'Ambra V. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.L 1973), the court listed five
factors which would in combination determine the foreseeability of the presence of a parent
at- the scene of an accident involving a child: the age of the child, the type of neighbor-
hood, the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood, the time of day, and "all
other circumstances which would have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely presence
of a parent." 354 F. Supp. at 820. See also Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine: Emotional
Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 TurL. L .Rav. 782 (1974):
The test should ... be . ..whether the judge or jury is convinced from all the
facts that there existed such a rapport between the victim and the one suffering
shock as to make the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
shock understandable.
Id. at 793.
194 See, e.g., White v. Diamond, 390 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1974); Jelley v. LaFlame,
108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969); Wetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Guilmette v. Alexander,
128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
195See, e.g., Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., - Hawaii -, 532 P.2d 673
(1975), in which recovery was sought on behalf of the decedent whose daughter and
granddaughter were killed in an automobile accident in Hawaii. The decedent learned of
the deaths by telephone while he was in California and suffered a fatal heart attack. The
Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed a summary judgment for the defendants, the court con-
cluding that such a consequence was unforeseeable as a matter of law. I submit that the
court is using foreseeability in some special, though as yet unarticulated, manner, and that
several more cases of this sort should suffice to reveal the new limits on liability for fright
without impact in that jurisdiction.
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b. Liability for Economic Harm
My interest in this subject in the present context stems entirely
from a recent decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,196 in which the traditional
rule denying negligence-based recovery for pure economic harm197 was
thrown over in favor of determining liability on the basis of reasonable
foreseeability. The plaintiffs in that case, commercial fishermen, sought
to recover for profits allegedly lost when the defendants' negligent oil
spillage harmed fishing grounds off the coast of Santa Barbara, Cali-
fornia. Affirming a denial of defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, the court of appeals drew upon the decision of the Supreme Court
of California in Dillon v. Legg 9 8 and established the same type of
"cluster of factors" test as was there applied to the fright without im-
pact problem.
The relevance of Oppen to the present analysis should be clear.
Whatever may be said for the substantive social policies underlying
the traditional rule denying recovery for negligently caused economic
harm, 99 from our process perspective the rule serves the necessary func-
tion of placing practical limits upon liability without necessitating a case
by case analysis of whether recovery by the plaintiff is in the best in-
terests of society. Economic harm shares with mental upset a charac-
teristic open-endedness which has traditionally prompted courts to irri-
pose limits upon potential exposure to liability for even foreseeable
harm. 20  Once the decision is reached that limits other than foresee-
ability are required, my analysis strongly suggests that those limits must
be relatively formal if the integrity of the judicial process is to be pre-
served. As the court in Oppen makes clear,201 exceptions to the rule
denying liability for economic harm have been recognized over the
years ;202 but I submit that all of the exceptions share a certain for-
196 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
197 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 at 952 (4th ed.
1971); Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence, 50 CAN. BAR REV. 580 (1972).
198 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
199 The opinion in Oppen refers to "the proposition that a contrary rule, which would
allow compensation for all losses of economic advantages caused by defendant's negligence,
would subject the defendant to claims based upon remote and speculative injuries which he
could not foresee in any practical sense of the term." 501 F.2d at 563. See generally 88
HARV. L. REv. 444, 447-50 (1974).
200 See text accompanying notes 183-84 supra.
201 See 501 F.2d at 565-68.
202 E.g., where there is a special, often contractual, relation between the parties; where
the defendant is engaged in certain professions, businesses, or trades; or where the plaintiff
has suffered tangible injury to person or property.
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mality which allows them rationally to be subjected to adjudication.?
In purporting to move to a "foreseeability under all the circumstances"
test, the Oppen court clearly joins ranks with what I have referred to
throughout this analysis as the growing retreat from the rule of law.
As a practical matter, I doubt that the decision will have a sig-
nificant impact. The same result apparently could have been reached in
that case on narrower legal grounds, which may detract from its strength
as precedent.20 Moreover, the court expressly refused to extend its
holding to persons-e.g., shoreline businessmen--other than commercial
fishermen who may foreseeably have suffered economic harm from the
oil spill,205 thus contradicting its commitment to foreseeability as the true
limit of defendants' liability. But these defects aside, the decision repre-
sents a clear example of a court compelled by social pressures to abandon
the rule of law in favor of an approach which, were it extended very
far, would lead to chaos. That the Oppen court may have been beguiled
and misled by the sort of open-ended scholarly analysis of legal prob-
lems currently in vogue is suggested by that portion of the opinion in
which "guidelines" from recent economic analyses are employed as
alternative means of reaching a decision.206 The unnerving spectacle
of the court purporting to apply so open-ended a standard as the "cheap-
est cost avoider" in reaching its conclusion is one which I am sure
even the author of that currently popular idea never anticipated nor
intended.0 7
203 1 hope that by now the basic pattern of the traditional common law approach to
potentially difficult areas is clear: a general no-duty rule, subject to a system of relatively
formal, and therefore adjudicable, exceptions. This is the basic pattern observed earlier in
connection with the pre-MacPherson privity rule in products cases, cf. notes 41-45 supra &
text accompanying, and the pre-Rowland rules governing liability of possessors to persons
coming on the land, c]. notes 151-57 supra. These traditional "no-duty exceptions" systems
support what I have in my first year torts classes called the "layered analysis" approach
to legal problems. For a recent article which seems to reach the same conclusion-i.e., that
a certain amount of layered analysis is necessary to the proper functioning of adjudication-
see Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 556 (1973).
204 For an argument that the same result could have been reached under public nuisance
doctrines, see 88 HARv. L. Rmv. 444, 446-47 (1974).205 See 501 F.2d at 570-71.
20 6 See 501 F.2d at 569-70, wherein the court attempts to apply the concept of "the
cheapest cost avoider" to reach its result. Cf. G. CALABmasI, Tnm CoST or ACCIDENTS 69-73
(1970).
207 In a recent article, Professor Calabresi recognizes that his general theories must be
translated into sufficiently specific rules, or "categories." See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1070 (1972). In that same article,
he expresses some doubt that courts will be able to work these rules out. See id. at 1077-78.
I should make clear that I am not opposed to courts making use of concepts such as
"cheapest cost avoider" as general policy backdrops to the application of more formal rules
of decision. It is just that such a concept is, in and of itself, too open-ended to serve as
the rule of decision. Cf. notes 201-03 infra & text accompanying.
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C. The Role of Torts Commentary in Hastening the Retreat
As I have indicated throughout the preceding analysis, torts com-
mentary in recent years has been overwhelmingly in favor of expanding
and purifying the negligence concept. Although I have no data which
clearly establish that this commentary has had a significant impact upon
our courts, and although judges have occasionally rejected some of the
more outlandish aspects of these scholarly entreatments, I am probably
justified in assuming that such commentary has hastened the develop-
ments to which I have referred. From our present perspective, one of
the most interesting aspects of torts scholarship has been its tendency
to focus upon the substantive content of the rules of liability, together
with underlying social policy objectives, almost to the total exclusion
of any concern for the process implications of proposed reforms. A
deep-rooted distrust of legal formality, combined with a commitment to
compensating accident victims and an abiding faith in the capacity of
adjudication to solve any problem on a "reasonableness under all the
circumstances" basis, has all but eliminated serious consideration of the
sorts of questions I have tried to raise. Consequently, any doctrine or
rule of law which creates a formal impediment-to imposing liability for
all harm foreseeably caused by unreasonably risky conduct tends to be
condemned automatically by a majority of writers as an unjustifiable
hold-over from a more conservative, by-gone social era.
To this largest category of torts commentary may be added a
smaller but nevertheless influential category which tends equally to re-
flect indifference towards the process problems of implementing princi-
ples of liability. In recent years, legal writers have begun to employ
economic theory in analyzing torts problems. 208 The tendency has been
to advance very broad, very basic principles of liability, against which
existing doctrines are judged and upon which they are criticized. Al-
though the necessity of translating these broad principles into workably
specific rules of decision has been recognized,20 9 very little of the sort
has actually been accomplished. And when a writer employing economic
analysis does occasionally translate his theories into proposed modifica-
tions of the common law, the result is likely to be unworkable and un-
manageable from the perspective of the limits of adjudication. 2 0 Eco-
nomic analysis has made a very real contribution to our growing under-
208 See, e.g., G. CAmABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
209 See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 207.
210 See, e.g., Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. LAw &
EcoN. 201 (1971). Although the author does assert that the form of the rule is not his
main concern, id. at 217, it is clear that he advocates a "cluster of factors" approach simi-
lar to the approaches criticized throughout the present article. See id. at 214.
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standing of the policy objectives underlying our system of law. Thus
far, however, writers employing these principles have appeared rela-
tively indifferent to the problems I have tried to raise here. Focusing
as they do upon the substantive policy objectives of our system, they
have tended to ignore the realities of the limits of adjudication.
If indifference and insensitivity to process problems were all that
judicial integrity had to overcome in its struggle for survival amidst the
expansions of negligence law in recent years, the role of legal commen-
tary would scarcely deserve to be labelled "irresponsible." However,
there is a third category of torts commentary to which I must reluctantly
apply that label. These are commentaries which tend to speak of the
common law torts judgment as a tool of harassment in modem political
warfare, and whose disregard for judicial integrity approaches reckless-
ness. Thus, in law journals in recent years have appeared statements
such as "The courts have become the major political arena in which
people's rights are being redressed and protected.... Tort law is a very
big part of the people's courtroom power .... Tort suits are an avenue
which groups and classes of people can use to have an input into the
behavior of institutions which in turn . . . affect the quality of their
lives."2 ' And "The New Torts will concern itself with remedies against
the abuse of power-political, economic, intellectual, as well as physi-
cal.
The conclusion is that the New Torts must be made to deal
more explicitly with the question of what large enterprises and other
clusters of power owe to the individual caught in their toils. . . . The
New Torts then will emphasize more sharply the question of what de-
fendants representing significant clusters of different kinds of power
owe to our civilization in the way of behaving in a civilized manner."
212
I cannot imagine statements more inconsistent with the realities and
limitations of the judicial process. If they truly speak for the future,
then we all had better start looking for another line of work.
In reacting critically to the indifference of torts commentators to
the process problems I have raised, I do not intend to suggest that I am
the first person to voice concern over the process implications of recent
developments in negligence law. Over the years, writers have questioned
the propriety of courts implementing the negligence concept with no
more formal guide to decision than "what is reasonable under all the
211 Sunick, A Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 410, 423-24 (1974).
2 1 2 Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70's, 22 STAx. L. Rlv. 330,
333-35 (1970).
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circumstances."21 For example, there could be found no clearer state-
ment of the basic position I have tried to advance than the following
excerpt from a review in 1959 of a then-recently published torts treatise
espousing the "let the jury decide on all the circumstances" approach:
There is much more at stake here than superficially appears, for
a "law" of negligence derived from such all-encompassing generaliza-
tions as these is not a system of law at all, but only a conceptual con-
duit through which all cases are funneled into the jury room .... The
actual criteria for the adjudication of the claim will be solely those
which the particular jury, in the individual case, chooses in its uncon-
trolled discretion to apply in the secrecy of the jury room, unencum-
bered by the embarrassing necessity of explaining its decision.... To
me this involves a shocking abdication of judicial responsibility which
is in no measure made more commendable by the fact that its pro-
ponents see it as an indirect approach to a basis of liability in tort
which they deem preferable to that recognized in the past.
It is, then, entirely possible that without being conscious of what
we are doing we may jettison completely the intricate system by which
our forebears sought to achieve a modicum of what we have called
"rule of law" in favor of one by which disputes between individuals
will be committed to the uncontrolled discretion of the tribunal . ..
There are those who view this as the ultimate flowering of the demo-
cratic method, and for that reason as a desirable development. I do
not.
Its substantial acceptance by the courts would, it seems to
me, subject to grave question the continuing validity of the common
law system itself.214
If I possess any advantage in writing now of these same concerns, it
certainly does not inhere in any edge in eloquence over the author of
the preceding excerpt. Rather, it may be the advantage of being able to
look back over the intervening seventeen years and to document the
"substantial acceptance by the courts" of the principle of decision-by-
discretion to which the author despairingly refers in the last sentence of
his review.
CONCLUSION
Reviewing the reforms and developments in negligence law in recent
years, a pattern quite clearly emerges. Gradually, the negligence con-
218 See, e.g, R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JusrcE 67-69 (1969); Cooperrider, A
Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 Mtcl. L. Rtv. 1291 (1959); Dickinson, Legal Rules:
Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1931); Hoenig & Goetz,
A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsi-
bility, 6 Sw. L. REv. 1 (1974); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of
the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rmv. 509 (1974).2 1 4 Cooperrider, supra note 213, at 1310-12.
[Vol. 51:467
DEVELOPMENTS IN TORTS
cept has been expanded and purified to the point that courts are begin-
ning routinely to confront problems which are beyond their capacity
to solve. Some areas of recent reform are practically and economically
more significant than others, and in some, courts generally have resisted
the temptation to follow early leads which would have exposed them to
process difficulties in the name of trying to achieve individualized justice
in every case, but all of these areas of reform represent potential threats
in principle to the integrity of the judicial process. Torts commentary
during this same period of change has been woefully insensitive to both
the source and the magnitude of these threats. By and large, torts
writers and scholars have encouraged and supported the expansionary
trend, and have evinced a naive and misplaced confidence in the ability
of courts to solve all of society's problems through the application of
principles of tort liability. At the very least, much of what has been
written in recent years deserves to be, and I believe one day will be,
adjudged undisciplined. At their worst, some of the recent commen-
taries have been irresponsible.
Throughout this article I have referred to the mounting threat to
judicial integrity in essentially theoretical terms. If courts are begin-
ning to abandon principled decisionmaking in these cases, then as profes-
sionals we ought to deplore this circumstance quite apart from whether,
as a practical matter, the incidental enlargement of the opportunity of
injured plaintiffs to recover damages happens to suit our politics. But
for those to whom practical politics is everything, and for whom a sac-
rifice of means is acceptable if it achieves desired ends, let us consider
practicalities for a moment. If I am right, and we have reached the
point where our zeal for expansion and purification of negligence law
is running away with us, then the problems which lie ahead are most
certainly not limited to the theoretical variety. Once the negligence-
under-all-the-circumstances lottery is seen for what it is, the expense
and inefficiency associated with it will make a wide range of alterna-
tives socially attractive.21 (In fact, the only persons who will stand to
benefit from its continuance will be torts lawyers and scholars.) When
that day arrives, and the torts process has finally been replaced by some
more efficient and honest (albeit "dehumanized") mode of compensat-
ing victims of accidents, we shall have more than enough leisure time
to sit and ponder the wisdom of the parable of the goose and the
golden egg.
2 15For some idea of what the alternatives might look like in the fields of products
liability and medical malpractice see J. O'CoNrnL, ENDmo INSUT To INURY (1975).
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Can anything be done to arrest these destructive tendencies and to
put the torts process back on the right track? For one thing, I have an
abiding faith in the collective common sense (not to mention the in-
stinct for survival) of the judges whose primary responsibility it is to
administer our torts system. Our common law process has survived for
hundreds of years, and it is probably presumptuous to assume that it
should finally have met its match in the concept of negligence-based
tort liability. For another, it would be helpful if torts writers and
scholars would face up to the realities of the limits of adjudication and
begin tempering their zeal for social politics with a measure of respect
for the process implications of their proposals. Once again, I must em-
phasize that I do not object to reform, as such, but only to irresponsible
reform. We need not necessarily cling to traditional doctrinal formali-
ties in the face of changing social attitudes which call into question their
substantive content, although in most instances I would urge a strong
presumption in favor of their continuing validity. But in adapting and
reforming traditional tort doctrines to meet new and different social
conditions, we must recognize the necessity of retaining a sufficient
measure of formality in the rules governing liability. Courts must have
the courage to say "No" to plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the formal
prerequisites to recovery, and torts commentators must have the com-
mon sense to support them in this respect.
Of course, the common law system of negligence-based liability
may be beyond saving. It will be recalled that I began my analysis of
recent reforms and developments with the premise that there was noth-
ing wrong, per se, with the negligence concept from a process perspec-
tive. Quite possibly, this assessment may have been wrong. It may turn
out that the negligence concept bore within itself, from the very begin-
ning, the seeds of its own destruction. Because it was thought to be
necessary in the mid-nineteenth century to limit the strict liability of
institutional actors engaging in socially beneficial but nonetheless risky
conduct, the negligence principle was introduced ;216 and because it was
possible socially to justify formal limitations upon that principle, it
flourished for a time in good health. But because these formal limita-
tions were destined eventually to be attacked as antithetical to the grow-
ing trend towards socialization of accident costs, and because the aban-
donment of these formalities would expose courts to unadjudicable prob-
lems of social planning, the negligence concept may have been doomed
from the start. From the process perspective, the only workable systems
216 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 at 140 (4th ed.
1971); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law, 42 L.Q. Rzv. 184 (1926).
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of torts liability may be those based upon one form or another of strict
liability. Negligence, it may turn out, was an essentially unmanageable
and therefore self-destructive method of getting us from one system of
strict liability to another.217 In any event, this much seems certain:
unless sufficient formality is preserved, and in some instances reintro-
duced, in the rules governing liability, our common law negligence sys-
tem will not survive to the end of this century.
2 1 7 See generally Klemme, The EnterPiise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 153 (1976).
